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WHY FINANCIAL REGULATION  
KEEPS FALLING SHORT 
DAN AWREY* 
KATHRYN JUDGE** 
Abstract: This Article argues that there is a fundamental mismatch between the na-
ture of finance and current approaches to financial regulation. Today’s financial 
system is a dynamic and complex ecosystem. For these and other reasons, policy 
makers and market actors regularly have only a fraction of the information that 
may be pertinent to decisions they are making. The processes governing financial 
regulation, however, implicitly assume a high degree of knowability, stability, and 
predictability. Through two case studies and other examples, this Article examines 
how this mismatch undermines financial stability and other policy aims. This ex-
amination further reveals that the procedural checks on lawmaking meant to pro-
mote accountability and legitimacy often fail to further either end. They result in-
stead in excessive expenditures before new rules are adopted, counterproductive ef-
forts to perfect ever more detailed rules, and too little re-evaluation of existing rules 
in light of new information or changed circumstances. The mismatch between the 
nature of finance and how finance is regulated helps to explain why financial regu-
lation has failed in the past and why it will likely fail again. It also suggests the 
need for a new approach to financial regulation, one that acknowledges the limits 
of what can be known given the realities of today’s complex and constantly evolv-
ing financial ecosystem. 
INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the devastation it wreaked on the 
United States and other economies triggered a global rulemaking frenzy. In the 
United Kingdom, the prudential rulebook for banks ballooned from roughly 
400,000 words in 2007 to well over 720,000 in 2017.1 That is the equivalent of 
almost one hundred words of new rules per day, each and every day, for a dec-
ade. Similarly, in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act or Dodd-Frank) 
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1 Zahid Amadxarif, James Brookes, Nicola Garbarino, Rajan Patel & Eryk Walczak, The Lan-
guage of Rules: Textual Complexity in Banking Reforms 21–23 (Bank of Eng., Staff Working Paper 
No. 834, 2019). 
2020] Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short 2297 
weighed in at a whopping 364,844 words, or nearly 850 pages.2 The Dodd-
Frank Act further required eleven different federal agencies—sometimes work-
ing alone, other times in conjunction with others—to undertake 243 separate 
rulemaking processes and conduct sixty-seven studies.3 Using techniques from 
software programming, Andrew Lo and his co-authors have demonstrated that, 
while the average law may not be particularly complex, the Dodd-Frank Act 
most certainly is.4 They also found that Title XII of the United States Code 
(U.S. Code or the Code), which governs banks and banking, is second only to 
the Internal Revenue Code in its complexity.5 Moreover, it is complex in ways 
that make its failure likely, even before one moves from the Code to the dense 
thicket of regulations implementing the statutory scheme.6 
Given that almost a decade has passed since the Dodd-Frank Act and 
many other key post-crisis reforms were adopted, this is an opportune time to 
assess what we have learned about the processes governing how finance is 
regulated. One of the most striking features of the current landscape is just 
how much contestation remains. The core aim of all of this new rulemaking 
was to promote a more stable and resilient financial system.7 Yet it is far from 
clear whether the system is safer today than it was ten years ago. Global 
SRISK, a measure of systemic risk designed by Nobel Laureate Robert Engle 
and colleagues, is higher today than at any point in the last twenty years—
including at the height of the financial crisis and the subsequent European sov-
ereign debt crisis.8 Natasha Sarin and Larry Summers have shown that an array 
of key metrics of bank riskiness, such as volatility and expected returns, have 
not declined following the adoption of post-crisis reforms.9 In fact, some are 
                                                                                                                           
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see William Li, Pablo 
Azar, David Larochelle, Phil Hill & Andrew W. Lo, Law Is Code: A Software Engineering Approach 
to Analyzing the United States Code, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 297, 335 (2015) (ranking laws from the 
111th Congress by length). 
3 DAVIS POLK & WARDELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010, at i (2010), https://www.davis
polk.com/files/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DYB8-37LB]. 
4 Li et al., supra note 2, at 334. 
5 Id. at 343. 
6 Dodd-Frank is not alone in earning this dubious distinction. Others in this domain include the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and a number of omnibus bills. Id. at 334. 
7 Amadxarif, supra note 1, at 1. 
8 Systemic Risk Analysis Summary, V-LAB, https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/srisk [https://
perma.cc/RX7Q-BGKF]. 
9 Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, Understanding Bank Risk Through Market Measures, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2016, at 57, 60, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/sarintextfall16bpea.pdf [https://perma.cc/54NG-4KBY]. 
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even higher today. These metrics suggest that the heightened capital require-
ments and other reforms have not reduced “the risk of insolvency for major 
banks . . . as much as is generally supposed.”10 
More qualitative assessments of the aggregate impact of these reforms are 
similarly mixed.11 The Bipartisan Policy Center, for example, has concluded 
that, while the financial system is likely safer today than it was before the cri-
sis, there are still a number of “less-than-optimal outcomes and unintended 
consequences of [the] post-crisis reform[s].”12 Echoing a similar sentiment, 
Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, believes that although the 
reforms have been helpful on a number of fronts, the post-crisis reforms target-
ing banks have spurred a shift in risk-taking to “less regulated, more opaque 
part of the financial system.”13 According to Zandi, it is from this “shadow” 
banking system that the next “crisis will likely emanate.”14 Richard Sylla, fi-
nancial historian at New York University’s Stern School of Business, puts it 
even more bluntly. When asked whether the post-crisis reforms have erected 
the guardrails needed to protect against another crisis, he responded: “In a 
word, no.”15 
Shifting from aggregate assessments to the impact of specific reforms 
does not resolve this contestation. A recent report from the Congressional Re-
search Service acknowledges that even though numerous provisions in the 
Dodd-Frank Act were designed to ensure that large financial institutions could 
be wound down without threatening the health of the broader financial system, 
ten years and a great deal of rulemaking later, “commentators continue to de-
bate whether these provisions have improved the resiliency of the financial 
system.”16 The impact of a new, post-crisis requirement that all standardized 
derivatives be centrally cleared has been similarly mixed. The good news is 
that the reform seems to have had the intended beneficial effect of improving 
transparency in derivatives markets and facilitating multilateral netting in ways 
                                                                                                                           
10 Id. 
11 See Emily Stewart, How Close Are We to Another Financial Crisis? 8 Experts Weigh In, VOX 
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/18/17868074/financial-crisis-dodd-frank-lehman-
brothers-recession [https://perma.cc/U79B-FCLC] (collecting the views of experts on the likelihood of 
another financial crisis a decade following the collapse of Lehman Brothers). 
12 MARTIN N. BAILY, JUSTIN SCHARDIN & PHILLIP L. SWAGEL, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., DID 
POLICYMAKERS GET POST-CRISIS FINANCIAL REGULATION RIGHT? 3 (2016), https://bipartisanpolicy.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-FRRI-Post-Crisis-Financial-Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U4RJ-5GK5]. 
13 Stewart, supra note 11. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45162, REGULATORY REFORM 10 YEARS AFTER 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 
(2018). 
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that might reduce contagion and uncertainty in the event that a major financial 
institution fails. The bad news is that the resulting concentration of market ac-
tivity has had the unintended, and quite serious, consequences of creating new 
sources of systemic risk and reducing interbank monitoring.17 Other examples 
abound.18 
Our aim here is not to defend or condemn any of the specific reforms put 
in place in the aftermath of the crisis. We believe that many have improved the 
resilience of the financial system, and we are skeptical of the recent efforts to 
roll back the progress that has been made. That said, we see the degree of on-
going contestation about what is working, what is not, and why, as itself im-
portant. The devastation that the financial crisis wreaked on the real economy 
was unequivocal. In the United States alone, unemployment jumped to ten per-
cent, major stock indices fell by half, and nearly nine million families lost their 
homes through foreclosure or related processes.19 The need for massive reform 
was uncontested, even if many of the specific reform efforts were not. 
Given the immensity of the public and private resources that have been 
brought to bear on the problem of financial fragility, the fact that so many 
questions about the impact of the reforms and the health of the financial sys-
tem linger is itself troubling. Our aim with this paper is to explore how this is 
possible. Why has this immense reform effort not produced a demonstrably 
more stable financial system? Answering this question not only helps to ex-
plain where we are now, but also why financial regulation has so often failed in 
the past. 
The literature already offers a number of potential explanations for why 
financial regulation so often falls short. One explanation, advanced by Roberta 
                                                                                                                           
17 See ALLIANZ GLOBAL INVESTORS ET AL., A PATH FORWARD FOR CCP RESILIENCE, RECOV-
ERY, AND RESOLUTION 1 (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-
releases/current/multimedia/ccp-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U25-UC4X]; Ivana Ruffini, Central 
Clearing: Risks and Customer Protections, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 4Q/2015, at 90 (describing how 
changes to regulation of counterparties following the financial crisis gave rise to new sources of risk). 
18 See infra notes 124–221 and accompanying notes. 
19 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: 
FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 17–18 (2013) (“The 
monthly unemployment rate peaked at around 10 percent in October 2009 and remained above 8 per-
cent for over 3 years, making this the longest stretch of unemployment above 8 percent in the United 
States since the Great Depression.”); Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Dec-
ade Won’t Return—NAR, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-who-
lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decade-wont-return-nar-1429548640#:~:text=Laura%20Kusisto,-
Biography&text=Less%20than%20one%2Dthird%20of,the%20National%20Association%20of%20
Realtors [https://perma.cc/X58D-GZJU] (“More than 9.3 million homeowners went through a foreclo-
sure, surrendered their home to a lender or sold their home via a distress sale between 2006 and 
2014.”); Alexandra Twin, Dow Fights Back, CNN Money (Mar. 6, 2009), https://money.cnn.com/
2009/03/06/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm [https://perma.cc/P3G7-96DC] (“Since closing at 
all-time highs on Oct[ober] 9, 2007, the Dow has lost nearly 53% and the S&P 500 has lost 56%.”). 
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Romano, is that regulation is too often the byproduct of an impulsive legisla-
tive response to a specific scandal or crisis.20 The net effect, in Romano’s view, 
is ill-conceived regulation designed more to quell public outrage than to ad-
dress underlying problems. A second explanation, rooted in public choice theo-
ry, posits that banks and other regulated actors exert too much influence over 
the lawmaking process, producing rules that protect their narrow interests at 
the expense of the wider public.21 A third, related explanation stems from the 
observation that public pressure to respond to financial crises is often fleeting, 
resulting in financial regulation that tends to weaken as the memory of a crisis 
fades over time.22 
Each of these accounts helps to explain why financial crises recur so often 
and in such familiar ways. Each also sheds some light on why the current re-
form project has not been more successful. Yet, even collectively, these exist-
ing accounts fail to provide a complete explanation for the disconcerting state 
of affairs we now face. First, Romano’s account is incomplete insofar as many 
of the most contentious post-crisis reforms were developed and proposed not 
by Congress, but by far less political, and more technocratic and deliberative, 
organizations. Second, an account based in public choice theory does not 
square with the fact that many of the unintended consequences of the reforms 
pose greater threats to banks than to the public. Finally, the tendency for regu-
lations to weaken over time does not explain the many questions being asked 
about the efficacy of the reforms themselves. 
This Article expands this list of explanations to include the nature of 
modern finance. It shows that another reason financial regulation keeps falling 
short—and will again unless revamped—is that the processes through which 
finance is regulated are poorly suited to the realities of modern finance. Mod-
ern finance is dynamic and complex. In this environment, policymakers inevi-
tably operate with an incomplete understanding of how the financial system 
works and how it will respond to regulatory intervention. Exacerbating this 
                                                                                                                           
20 See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley] (attributing the short-
falls in the corporate governance reforms contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in part, to the frantic 
political environment that followed in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals). 
21 Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 722, 
722–27 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
22 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends 
to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020–37 (2012) (estab-
lishing the idea of a “Regulatory Sine Curve,” from which it follows that the appetite for financial 
regulatory reform fluctuates based on temporal proximity to market crashes); see also Arthur E. Wil-
marth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. 
L. 441 (2017) (describing a revived interest in the aftermath of the financial crisis in reconstructing 
the structural barriers between commercial banks and capital markets erected by the Glass-Steagall 
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act)). 
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challenge is the tendency for the financial system to evolve in ways that mini-
mize the cost of complying with the existing regime, and hence in ways that 
tend to involve the movement of activity outside of regulated domains. Tomor-
row’s financial system will not look like today’s, and efforts to improve the 
stability and functioning of today’s system will be among the factors driving 
that change. 
Despite the complex and dynamic nature of modern finance, the process-
es governing how finance is regulated are often rooted in trans-substantive 
frameworks designed to accommodate domains that operate quite differently, 
or that reflect the static financial systems of a bygone era. The result is pro-
cesses that implicitly assume that policymakers and other stakeholders under-
stand the system they are regulating and how that system will respond to a giv-
en intervention. The consequences of this mismatch are myriad. In addition to 
regulations that fail to achieve desired aims, these results include excessive 
expenditure of public and private resources before new rules are adopted, 
counterproductive efforts to perfect rules, and too little meaningful accounta-
bility. We argue that this mismatch helps to explain the ongoing contestation 
surrounding the impact of post-crisis regulatory reforms. 
In offering a different explanation of the problem, we also advance a dif-
ferent approach for how to fix it. The good news—if it can be called that—is 
that finance is far from the only dynamic, complex, and incompletely under-
stood ecosystem in which we are nevertheless compelled to intervene. The 
human body is another. Just as morbidity and mortality have declined as doc-
tors have gone from simply treating disease to thinking more broadly about 
how to promote health, we suggest that the efficacy and resilience of the finan-
cial system could be enhanced by moving away from past efforts to narrowly 
address specific market failures and toward a more holistic and health-oriented 
approach to finance. We thus conclude by considering what a more holistic 
approach to financial regulation might entail and how it could help mitigate the 
mismatch that we identify as a core challenge for financial regulation today. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the interrelated phe-
nomena of dynamism, complexity, and unknowns and identifies each as core 
features of financial markets and institutions today.23 Part II provides a stylized 
account of how finance is regulated, looking specifically at the core legal pro-
cesses governing how financial regulation is made.24 Part III examines this 
mismatch in action: using two case studies—post-crisis money market mutual 
fund reform and the evolution of bank capital requirements—to demonstrate 
what actually happens when legal processes try to keep pace with the speed, 
                                                                                                                           
23 See infra notes 28–78 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text. 
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complexity, and opacity of modern finance.25 Part IV examines some of the 
recent regulatory reforms, along with proposals for further reform, that can be 
viewed as attempting to respond to elements of this mismatch.26 This examina-
tion suggests that although modest progress has been made, there are inherent 
limits in trying to use the existing regulatory framework to bridge the growing 
gap between finance and financial regulation. In Part V, we present our blue-
print for how to start to build a more holistic approach to financial regulation.27 
By recognizing the constitutive role of law in finance and embracing a more 
holistic mindset, we can devise new ways of analyzing how the law can best 
promote resilience and other aims. 
I. THE NATURE OF MODERN FINANCE 
Crafting effective financial regulation demands that policymakers start with 
an accurate understanding of the nature of the financial system and how it re-
sponds to regulation. This Part lays that foundation, demonstrating how dyna-
mism, complexity, and unknowns are core features of finance and core challeng-
es for financial regulation.28 To many, this might not seem controversial. None-
theless, the current state of financial regulation suggests that this observation has 
not been taken to heart. Indeed, while academics, policymakers, and others often 
pay lip service to the idea that the financial system is characterized by complexi-
ty, dynamism, and pervasive unknowns, most still cling to regulatory frame-
works and processes that look increasingly antiquated once we move these fea-
tures to the center—rather than just the periphery—of finance.29 Given that it is 
the relative importance, not existence, of these features that remains implicitly 
contested, our aim here is not only to gesture at them, but to explain why they 
ought to front and center in any discussion about how finance is regulated. 
A. Dynamism 
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed) Board of 
Governors, recently observed: “What almost overwhelms me in looking at the 
world of finance—banking and beyond banking—is how different it is from 
                                                                                                                           
25 See infra notes 124–222 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 223–260 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 261–268 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 28–78 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text (describing these views). 
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when I was most active.”30 This subpart explains why that is, why the financial 
system is continuing to evolve, and why dynamism is endemic to finance.31 
1. The Cyclical Nature of Finance 
One source of constant dynamism is the cyclicality that is built into fi-
nance. Stability in finance is not a sign that things are static, but rather, an im-
portant driver of structural change. As Hyman Minsky argued nearly fifty years 
ago: “[S]ustained economic growth, business cycle booms, and the accompa-
nying financial developments . . . generate conditions conducive to disaster for 
the entire economic system.”32 This occurs because “the structural characteris-
tics of the financial system change during periods of prolonged [economic] 
expansion.”33 Stability breeds inflated expectations that such stability will con-
tinue, which drives the very risk-taking that in time will bring it to an end.34 
Economists since Minsky have formalized some of the ways that periods 
of stability spur changes in behavior and pricing that contribute to the structur-
al dynamics that he viewed as core. Work on the credit cycle, for example, 
shows how changes in the price of assets used as factors of production and as 
collateral for loans can accelerate boom and bust cycles.35 John Geanakoplos 
has shown that periods of growth lead to higher leverage, which translates into 
higher asset prices, providing a distinct mechanism for built-in cyclicality.36 
Economists have also started offering more institutionally nuanced accounts of 
the ways that stability can breed risk-taking. Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse 
Pedersen, for example, have shown how interactions between the two sides of 
dealer balance sheets can exacerbate cyclicality.37 The mechanisms formalized 
                                                                                                                           
30 Mike Mayo, Paul Volcker on Conflicts, Ethics, and the US Banking Industry, CFA INST.:
ENTERPRISING INV. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2019/02/25/paul-volcker-
on-conflicts-ethics-and-the-us-banking-industry/ [https://perma.cc/MVQ4-XCH5]. 
31 See infra notes 32–59 and accompanying text. 
32 HYMAN P. MINSKY, STEERING COMM. FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL REAPPRAISAL DISC. MECHA-
NISM APPOINTED BY BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL INSTABILITY REVISITED: 
THE ECONOMICS OF DISASTER 1 (1970), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/federal%20
reserve%20history/discountmech/fininst_minsky.pdf [https://perma.cc/82G5-4RU9]. 
33 Id. at 1–2. 
34 See id. 
35 Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, Credit Cycles, 105 J. POL. ECON. 211, 212 (1997); see also 
Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 
78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (1996) (“[C]hanges in credit-market conditions amplify and propagate 
the effects of initial real or monetary shocks.”); Arvind Krishnamurthy & Tyler Muir, How Credit 
Cycles Across a Financial Crisis 1–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23850, 
2017) (identifying the fluctuations of credit markets and output throughout a financial crisis cycle). 
36 John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle 1–5 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 1715R, 
2010). 
37 Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 2201, 2201–03 (2009). 
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in these accounts vary, but each show that the behavior of market participants 
and the structures they build are constantly changing, and changing in ways 
that may exacerbate fragility. 
2. Regulatory Endogeneity 
Regulation further contributes to the dynamism and cyclicality of finance. 
Most importantly, regulation spurs regulatory arbitrage. As Robin Greenwood 
and co-authors explain: “There is no set of ex ante rules, no matter how granu-
lar or how sophisticated, that can satisfactorily tackle the problem of regulato-
ry arbitrage . . . .”38 When government introduces new regulations, the struc-
ture of the financial system will inevitably evolve to reduce the costs of com-
pliance. 
This dynamic can be observed in the repeated growth of various forms of 
“shadow banking.” This term grew in prominence following the crisis, as it 
became apparent that many of the early cracks had emanated from a network 
of interconnected institutions that collectively engaged in the same type of 
credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation as conventional banks. Like 
banks, this network funded mortgages and other long-term loans using short-
term debt, with commercial paper, repurchase, or “repo,” agreements, and 
money market funds serving as substitutes for deposits.39 In between these two 
ends laid an array of institutions and relationships that functioned largely out-
side the perimeter of banking regulation. Given the myriad costs associated 
with operating a bank, from complying with activity restrictions to ongoing 
supervisory oversight and deposit insurance premiums, regulatory arbitrage 
was likely among the forces driving the rapid growth of this shadow banking 
system in the years leading up to the crisis. 
Yet, this was not the first or only shadow banking system. Economic his-
torian Hugh Rockoff has shown that eleven of the twelve financial panics in 
the United States between 1819 and 2008 emanated from that day’s version of 
the shadow banking system.40 The Panic of 1907, for example, which led to 
the creation of the Fed, erupted in trust companies—bank-like institutions that 
                                                                                                                           
38 ROBIN GREENWOOD ET AL., BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, STRENGTHENING AND 
STREAMLINING BANK CAPITAL REGULATION 33 (Aug. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/6_greenwoodetal.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R47-9C7E]; see also Charles W. 
Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29 CATO J. 65, 65 (2009) (“Financial inno-
vations often respond to regulation by sidestepping regulatory restrictions that would otherwise limit 
activities in which people wish to engage.”). 
39 See generally ZOLTAN POSZAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458: 
SHADOW BANKING (2012), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/
sr458.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2GZ-3T48] (describing shadow banking). 
40 COPING WITH FINANCIAL CRISES: SOME LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC HISTORY 77–106 (Hugh 
Rockoff & Isao Suto eds., 2018). 
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developed outside a private clearinghouse regime that helped protect banks 
from destabilizing runs.41 Like compliance with any regime—public or pri-
vate—that promotes the safety and soundness of financial institutions, compli-
ance with clearinghouse rules entailed significant regulatory costs. Those costs 
created opportunities for market participants who could find ways to provide 
bank-like services without assuming the corresponding burdens. 
At least in the United States, there does not seem to be any way to escape 
this pattern. The regulatory burdens imposed following the crisis—no matter 
how justifiable—will invite yet further evolution and the migration of activity 
to less regulated spaces. These developments are already underway. For exam-
ple, a recent report by the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center 
shows that most home loans are now securitized by government-affiliated enti-
ties.42 And as of June 2018, nonbanks originated sixty-four percent of those 
mortgages—a dramatic increase from the pre-crisis era.43 Nonbanks also pro-
vide disproportionately more credit to borrowers with lower credit scores.44 
Other recent reports show that the same thing is happening beyond housing, 
and beyond the United States.45 The significant new regulatory burdens im-
posed on banks are not stopping the flow of credit; instead, the system is 
evolving to provide that credit outside the regulated banking sector. 
3. Innovation 
Another important driver of the dynamism of modern finance is innova-
tion. These innovations include theoretical insights (like the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model), technological developments (like massive increases in 
computing power), and the emergence of new financial markets, institutions, 
and instruments (like derivatives and structured finance). Indeed, dramatic 
change in finance very often entails the combination of all three types of inno-
vation. The almost daily pronouncements about how big data and artificial in-
telligence are going to “disrupt” finance are merely the most recent manifesta-
                                                                                                                           
41 Id.; see also ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED 
FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 146–47, 161–62 (2007) (describing how trust companies con-
tributed to the economic instability that led to the panic of 1907). 
42 See LAURIE GOODMAN ET AL., HOUSING FIN. POL’Y CTR., URBAN INST., HOUSING FINANCE 
AT A GLANCE: A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK 31 (July 2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/98817/july_2018_chartbook_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF6G-EYBW]. 
43 Id. at 12. 
44 See id. at 13. 
45 See Paul J. Davies, Banks and Private Markets: Marking Fresh Connections, WALL STREET J. 
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-and-private-markets-making-fresh-connections-
1533722346 [https://perma.cc/EEC6-R672] (providing an overview of recent trends). 
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tions of a continual process of innovation that has been underway for decades, 
if not centuries.46 
Consider again the rise of the particular form of shadow banking that 
emerged prior to the last crisis. Depending on how one measures it, this system 
remains as large as the regulated banking sector.47 Even if regulatory cost sav-
ings propelled part of its growth, shadow banking’s capacity to disperse risks 
once concentrated in banks across the financial system may also have had real 
efficiency gains, enabling homeowners and others to access more affordable 
credit.48 Neither the regulatory cost savings nor those efficiency gains, howev-
er, would have been possible without the myriad of technologies enabling se-
curitization, money market funds, and other key features of this system. These 
innovations included creative new uses of legal structures, new modeling tech-
niques, and massive increases in computing power that allowed the collection 
and analysis of vast amounts of data about creditor and asset quality. 
In the decade since the crisis, innovation has continued apace. In the past 
three years alone, more than $120 billion in new capital has been invested 
globally in fintech firms.49 Established banks, too, are investing in innovation. 
A recent Citibank report shows that banks spend between 15% and 25% of 
their annual budgets on improvements in technology.50 To put that in perspec-
tive, this means that the median spending on technology is higher in the bank-
ing sector than in any other single sector—including “high tech” firms.51 Even 
a brief look at the technologies currently changing finance—from the use of 
                                                                                                                           
46 See generally CITI GPS: GLOBAL PERSP. & SOLUTIONS, BANK OF THE FUTURE: THE ABCS OF 
DIGITAL DISRUPTION IN FINANCE (Mar. 2018), https://www.codex.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
Bank_of_the_future.pdf [https://perma.cc/39KU-RQUV]. 
47 Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 415 (2017) 
[hereinafter Judge, Information Gaps] (“Recent estimates suggest that the shadow banking system in 
the United States is larger than the banking system and poised for further growth.”). 
48 Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Innovation, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 291, 329 (2018) [hereinafter 
Judge, Investor-Driven Innovation] (“One of the most important benefits of investor-driven innova-
tion is its potential to improve price efficiency and reduce the cost of capital for borrowers. For exam-
ple, by expanding the types of investors who could provide capital to home loans, the innovations just 
described should have, and seemingly did, reduce the cost of getting a home loan.”). 
49 Chia Tek Yew, Global Fintech Funding Tops US$31B for 2017—Fueled by US$8.7B in Q4: 
KPMG’s Pulse of Fintech Report, KPMG (Feb. 13, 2018), https://home.kpmg/sg/en/home/media/
press-releases/2018/02/global-fintech-funding-tops-us-31b-for-2017-kpmg-pulse-of-fintech-report.
html [https://perma.cc/4DXS-NGN8]. 
50 CITI GPS, supra note 46, at 59 (“IT expenses as a percentage of revenues are notably higher in 
the Banking industry than any other (~9%) and almost 2[–]3 [times] those of other major industries. 
[Citi’s] bottom-up analysis indicates that approximately . . . 15[–]25% of banks’ annual costs are 
allocated to IT.”). 
51 See id. (showing median IT expenses for banking at 8.7% and 5.2% for high tech). 
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big data and artificial intelligence in assessing creditworthiness52 to the ongo-
ing experimentation with blockchain as a means of transforming how assets 
are held and transferred—suggests significant changes lie ahead.53 
New technologies are already disrupting established institutions in many 
emerging markets. The rise of the so-called “shadow payment system”—
institutions that perform core payment functions outside the regulated banking 
system—in Asia, Africa, and South America is just one example of how new 
technology is changing the face of finance.54 In China, for example, platforms 
such as Alipay and WeChat Pay have each attracted almost one billion users.55 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, over 130 mobile money platforms have 
been launched in the decade since the first platform, M-Pesa, was established 
in Kenya.56 Only a few short years ago, technological limitations would have 
made these developments almost unthinkable. 
4. Radical Change 
Dynamism is sometimes incremental and predictable. But sometimes it is 
not. The relentless dynamism of the financial system may well result in chang-
es that are hard to even imagine today. Such claims are not just the domain of 
technologists. In 2006, it would have likely seemed unthinkable that in a few 
short years, of the five leading investment banks—Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley—one would file 
for bankruptcy, another would be acquired on the brink of bankruptcy, a third 
would need to be acquired to ensure its survival, and the remaining two would 
both choose to become far more heavily regulated bank holding companies. 
Yet that is precisely what happened. 
Mervyn King, former head of the Bank of England, puts the situation 
thusly: “The essential challenge facing everyone living in a capitalist economy 
                                                                                                                           
52 See AARON KLEIN, BROOKINGS INST., CREDIT DENIAL IN THE AGE OF AI (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/credit-denial-in-the-age-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/WA62-HUBA] 
(explaining that, in positive and negative ways, “AI has the power to transform consumer lending”). 
53 Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb. 
2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain [https://perma.cc/H2AQ-DJ83] (“Block-
chain is a foundational technology: It has the potential to create new foundations for our economic 
and social systems.”). 
54 Dan Awrey & Kristin van Zwieten, The Shadow Payment System, 43 J. CORP. L. 775, 776–81 
(2018) (“[Shadow banking] institutions perform the same core payment functions as conventional 
deposit-taking banks . . . [and] reside outside the perimeter of the regulated banking system.”). 
55 AARON KLEIN, BROOKINGS INST., IS CHINA’S NEW PAYMENT SYSTEM THE FUTURE? 8 (June 
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ES_20190620_Klein_ChinaPayments.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BLJ5-DXGB]. 
56 GSM ASS’N, THE MOBILE ECONOMY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 3, 26 (2019), https://www.
gsma.com/mobileeconomy/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/GSMA_MobileEconomy2020_SSA_Eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BQF3-8KEZ]. 
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is the inability to conceive of what the future may hold. The failure to incorpo-
rate radical uncertainty into economic theories was one of the factors responsi-
ble for the misjudgments that led to the crisis.”57 In King’s assessment, this is a 
failure that has yet to be corrected—despite the scale and scope of post-crisis 
reforms. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s best-selling book on “Black Swans” makes a 
similar point: Our perceptions of the world are inherently limited by our expe-
rience and tendency to believe that we understand far more about how the 
world works and what it will look like in the future than is possible given the 
inherently limited data on which our current understandings are based.58 As he 
explains, “Black Swan logic makes what you don’t know far more relevant than 
what you do know.”59 The crisis helped propel the success of his book because 
it was such a powerful example of the phenomenon he helps explain. That so 
many of the post-crisis accounts suggest believing in securitization is equiva-
lent to believing in magic or deny that such structures can produce asset-
backed securities that are of a higher quality than the underlying loans—and 
believe us, they can—exemplifies how core these dynamics are to finance. 
B. Complexity 
A second defining feature of modern finance is its ever-increasing com-
plexity. Economists Jacopo Carmassi and Richard Herring, for example, have 
shown that the average number of subsidiaries controlled by the largest global 
banks roughly doubled—to more than one thousand—between 2002 and 
2013.60 Compounding matters, these subsidiaries often operated in different 
jurisdictions and typically engaged in a wide variety of different activities. As 
a result, they were often subject to oversight by different regulators who do not 
necessarily coordinate their regulation or supervision.61 As Carmassi and Her-
ring explain, these complex and opaque organizational structures both impeded 
                                                                                                                           
57 MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 9 (2016). 
58 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE, at 
xxii–xxiii (2d ed. 2010). 
59 Id. at xxiii. 
60 See Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International Financial 
Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF BANKING 195, 197–201 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2012). 
61 Id. at 214–16 (describing the complexity of banking regulation and how financial conglomer-
ates might be forced to “adopt a certain amount of corporate separateness for regulatory purposes”); 
see also id. at 209, tbl.8.2 (showing the breakdown of subsidiaries of large complex financial institu-
tions).62 Id. at 216 (“This kind of [regulatory dialectic] has undoubtedly increased the corporate com-
plexity of [large complex financial institutions]. In the event of financial distress, however, this com-
plexity could impede an effective regulatory response.”). 
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effective ex ante oversight and greatly complicated crisis management and the 
resolution of failing institutions.62 
Complexity is also a key feature of many financial instruments. Using 
lexicographic analysis, Claire Célérier and Boris Vallée examined the term 
sheets of 55,000 retail structured products issued between 2002 and 2010 to 
study how these instruments evolved over time.63 They found that these in-
struments were getting more complex over time—with average complexity 
increasing substantially prior to the crisis, leveling off between 2007 and 2009, 
and then continuing to rise in 2010.64 They also found that, at least in the retail 
market, “product complexity is associated with higher product profitability for 
banks and lower performance for investors.”65 
The proliferation of complex instruments can spur fundamental changes 
in the structure of the financial system. Securitization illustrates this point. 
Traditionally, when banks made loans, they held those loans on their balance 
sheets. Securitization allows banks and other originating creditors to instead 
bundle these loans together into newly created, bankruptcy remote vehicles. To 
fund the acquisition of these loans, the vehicles simultaneously issue brand 
new securities, such as mortgage-backed securities or collateralized debt obli-
gations, which entitle the holder to the cash flows from the underlying loans. 
These rights are set forth in detailed waterfall provisions that explain how 
these cash flows will be distributed among the different tranches of issued se-
curities. Because the underlying loans are inherently unique, so too are the in-
tricate waterfall provisions. The detailed representations and warranties pursu-
ant to which those loans are sold from the originating creditors to the securiti-
zation vehicle are also unique and can vary significantly. The aggregate impact 
of these contractual provisions, the creation of new legal entities, and the ap-
pointment of third parties—such as a servicer to interact with the borrowers 
and a trustee to accept cash flows and pay them out according to the water-
fall—generates significant new complexities by introducing layers of new in-
formation that previously had not mattered to the value of the underlying in-
struments.66 
                                                                                                                           
62 Id. at 216 (“This kind of [regulatory dialectic] has undoubtedly increased the corporate com-
plexity of [large complex financial institutions]. In the event of financial distress, however, this com-
plexity could impede an effective regulatory response.”). 
63 See generally CLAIRE CÉLÉRIER & BORIS VALLÉE, WHAT DRIVES FINANCIAL COMPLEXITY? 
A LOOK INTO THE RETAIL MARKET FOR STRUCTURED PRODUCTS (2013), https://www.hbs.edu/
faculty/conferences/2013-household-behavior-risky-asset-mkts/Documents/What-Drives-Financial-
Complexity_Celerier-Vallee.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF5Z-CVLV]. 
64 Id. at 38 fig.3. 
65 Id. at 2. 
66 See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and 
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 690–93 (2012). See generally Larry Cordell, Yilin Huang & 
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The final point to emphasize is that the complexity of securitization vehi-
cles and the ways they redistributed risks mattered. The complexity also in-
creased—by orders of magnitude—the time, effort, and other costs associated 
with producing information about the location, nature, and extent of the relevant 
risks.67 As then Fed Governor Randall Krozsner observed during the crisis: 
In the old days, we used to know where the risks were; unfortunate-
ly, we knew that they were all on the bank balance sheets. With the 
originate-to-distribute model and securitization, we have been able 
to move to a different model in which the risks are much more dis-
persed . . . . [I]t leads to potential pockets of uncertainty, and that is 
exactly what has come up.68 
This complexity meant that neither market participants nor regulators had a 
good understanding of how exposures to subprime mortgages were dispersed 
across the financial system. Nor could they readily produce that information 
when it really counted. This exacerbated market dysfunction and impeded ef-
forts to contain the growing crisis.69 
The fact that complexity and the resulting information gaps have only in-
creased in the wake of the crisis speaks volumes about how finance works. The 
ongoing globalization of finance, the constantly shifting structure of the financial 
system, and the fact that market participants can often extract rents from greater 
opacity make complexity endemic to today’s financial system.70 In the view of 
Simon Levin and Andrew Lo, “[t]he financial system has crossed a threshold of 
complexity where the system is evolving faster than regulators and regulations 
                                                                                                                           
Meredith Williams, Collateral Damage: Sizing and Assessing the Subprime CDO Crisis (Fed. Re-
serve Bank Phila. Working Paper No. 11-30/R, 2012), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/
research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KT5-B6YD] 
(describing the complex and heterogeneous structure of securitization contracts and markets). 
67 See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative 
Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 55–56 (2010); Cordell, Huang & Williams, 
supra note 66. 
68 Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on September 18, 2007, FED. RES., https://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070918meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFF-
EYGK]. 
69 See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 47, at 477; Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role 
of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 913 (2016). 
70 See generally Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial 
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2012). 
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can keep pace.” 71 This view is echoed by Professor Steven Schwarcz, who ar-
gues that complexity is “the greatest financial-market challenge of the future.”72 
C. Unknowns 
The complexity of modern finance makes it prohibitively costly for mar-
ket participants and regulators to gather, much less analyze, the entire universe 
of potentially relevant information. As a result, these actors almost invariably 
operate with only a fraction of the information that may be pertinent to the de-
cisions they are making: relying instead on proxies—from ratings to reputa-
tion—to fill in the gaps. Dynamism accentuates this challenge. Information 
that is accurate at one point in time may not be accurate at another. Frictions 
that limit access to information further exacerbate the pervasiveness and size 
of information gaps. Counterparties can choose what information they will 
share, and what they will not. Different regulators have different jurisdictions, 
mandates, and objectives, limiting both the scope of their authority and their 
field of vision. The creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) and Office of Financial Research (OFR) in the United States has 
helped mitigate some of these frictions but has far from eliminated them. More 
importantly, given the incredible complexity and dynamism of finance, togeth-
er with the finite resources of regulators, high information and other costs re-
main a powerful constraint on who knows what at any point in time. 
Apart from these large information gaps, a second factor exacerbating un-
knowns is uncertainty. Finance is about risk. But as Frank Knight long ago 
explained, not all future events can be understood in probabilistic terms.73 Spe-
cifically, there are categories of things that might happen—good and bad—that 
are simply beyond our collective imagination. These are Donald Rumsfeld’s 
“unknown unknowns.” 74 These events encompass the “radical uncertainty” 
that Mervyn King describes.75 They also encompass changes that are subtler in 
                                                                                                                           
71 Simon A. Levin & Andrew W. Lo, Opinion: A New Approach to Financial Regulation, 112 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12,543 (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/112/41/12543.
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3Z7-9E8C]. 
72 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
213 (2009). 
73 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 232–33 (Cosimo Classics 2006) 
(1921); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 282 (rev. ed. 1976) (“In his seminal work, Frank 
Knight drew a sharp distinction between risk, as referring to events subject to a known or knowable 
probability distribution and uncertainty, as referring to events for which it was not possible to specify 
numerical probabilities.” (emphasis omitted)). 
74 Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 47, at 417–18 (“The risk-uncertainty dichotomy is useful 
because there are tools that can be used to manage risks that are not available when one is confronting 
an ‘unknown unknown.’”). 
75 See KING, supra note 57, at 120. 
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character but no less beyond our comprehension. This uncertainty opens the 
door to the possibility that tomorrow will look very different from today. 
As if information gaps and uncertainty were not challenging enough, fail-
ures of interpretation can further undermine understanding. It is not just that 
dynamism renders new information stale—it also undercuts the value of the 
frameworks we use to interpret this information. Both policymakers and mar-
ket actors often view information through a lens colored by an outdated under-
standing of the financial system. As explained by Richard Clarida, now Vice 
Chair of the Board of Governors of the Fed: “it would seem that the supervi-
sion and regulation of [U.S.] investment and commercial banks during the 
great moderation was based on an assumption about how the financial system 
was supposed to work, not upon sufficient knowledge about how the financial 
system actually worked.”76 Prior to 2008, policymakers and academics alike 
were fooled into believing that the system had become more stable at the pre-
cise moment that massive new forms of systemic risk were growing un-
checked. Banks looked well capitalized, and while regulators were well aware 
of each of the component parts of the shadow banking system, no one seemed 
to fully appreciate how the complex interdependencies between these parts 
exposed them to the same type of destabilizing runs as conventional banks.77 
The point here is not only that dynamism and complexity create un-
knowns; it is that economists, policymakers, and others are often ill-equipped 
to assess what they know and what they do not. This is not a challenge specific 
to these groups, but rather one common to all experts—and one they regularly 
fail to appreciate. As Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardiner explain, “absence of 
doubt” can be detrimental to good decision making, particularly in complex 
and changing environments.78 By failing to appreciate the limits of what is and 
can be known, current approaches to financial regulation may be discounting 
the most important features of modern finance. 
II. HOW FINANCE IS REGULATED 
So how do the complexity, dynamism, and unknowns of modern finance 
compare with the current processes through which finance is regulated? This 
Part presents a highly simplified, and in many ways stylized, account of these 
                                                                                                                           
76 RICHARD H. CLARIDA, WHAT HAS—AND HAS NOT—BEEN LEARNED ABOUT MONETARY 
POLICY IN A LOW INFLATION ENVIRONMENT? A REVIEW OF THE 2000S, at 9 (Oct. 12, 2010), https://
www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/conference/55/papers/Clarida.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/
CLW7-ZBBH] (emphasis omitted). 
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COMING 3–4 (2012); POSZAR ET AL., supra note 39, at 1–2. 
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processes.79 In this respect, our aim is to capture the essence of these process-
es, rather than their technical nuance. 
A. International Financial Regulation 
Financial regulation frequently starts at the international level. Beginning 
in the 1970s, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system80 and the increasing 
globalization of finance spurred the creation of several international organiza-
tions designed to foster greater cross-border regulatory coordination. These 
organizations included the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel 
Committee), the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions. In recent decades, these 
organizations have come to play an important role in setting international 
standards in areas such as bank capital, liquidity, and supervision, payment 
infrastructure, and securities regulation and enforcement.81 In the wake of the 
financial crisis, these organizations, alongside the G20 and Financial Stability 
Board, have often taken the lead in setting the global regulatory agenda.82 
The Basel Committee, created in 1974, is among the most influential of 
these international organizations and embodies the way international financial 
regulation works today. Members of the Basel Committee include the central 
bank governors and national bank supervisors of the G20 member states.83 Its 
“mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks 
worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability.”84 Although it 
purports to provide a three-pillar approach focused on bank capital, supervi-
sion, and market discipline, its rules regarding capital and liquidity are proba-
bly the most important in shaping and constraining lawmaking at the national 
level. The first Basel standards (Basel I) were published in 1988, after almost a 
                                                                                                                           
79 See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text. 
80 The Bretton Woods System was based on an international agreement between states that regu-
lated the international monetary system. 
81 See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GA. 
L.J. 257, 259–60 (2011) (providing a detailed description of the different roles played by these organi-
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82 Id. at 259. 
83 In total, the Basel Committee currently has forty-five members from twenty-eight jurisdictions. 
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international organizations. Basel Committee Membership, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS [BIS], 
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84 Basel Committee Charter, BIS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm [https://perma.cc/5A8Z-
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decade of protracted negotiations among its ten original member states.85 
These were followed by a series of technical amendments leading to the publi-
cation of Basel II in 2004.86 Basel II was itself still being implemented when 
the crisis of 2007–2009 prompted a fundamental overhaul of the Basel frame-
work under what would become known as Basel III.87 Published in 2010, Ba-
sel III was intended to be fully implemented by January 1, 2019.88 
The Basel Committee’s role in developing global banking standards re-
flects the work of other international organizations in several key respects. 
First, these organizations typically enjoy few, if any, formal legal powers, rely-
ing instead on negotiation and consensus to develop and promote the adoption 
of non-binding standards.89 Second, while politics plays a role in shaping their 
agenda and setting their standards, the process by which these organizations 
develop and refine these standards is highly technocratic.90 Third, reflecting 
both the political and technocratic nature of these organizations, the develop-
ment of these standards is often a slow, deliberative, and incremental process. 
Finally, despite the absence of formal legal power—or perhaps because of it—
these organizations have been relatively successful in promoting the adoption 
of international standards in a number of important areas.91 By 2015, for ex-
ample, over eighty jurisdictions—including the United States—had announced 
their intentions to adopt one or more of the core elements of Basel II.92 Ulti-
mately, of course, the power to incorporate these international standards into 
law still rests in the hands of domestic policymakers. 
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88 See BCBS, BASEL III GLOBAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 69 annex 4. 
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90 See id. at 279. 
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92 See BIS, FIN. STABILITY INST., FSI SURVEY—BASEL II, 2.5 AND III IMPLEMENTATION (June 
29, 2015), https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsiop2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NB2-VYY3]. 
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B. Statutes 
In the United States, the backbone of all financial regulation is the U.S. 
Code. The U.S. Code consists of all the statutes ever adopted by Congress, in-
cluding any amendments or modifications to earlier statutes. Title XII of the 
Code addresses banks and banking, while other core elements of financial reg-
ulation, like securities regulation, are codified elsewhere.93 
The process of making new laws, or modifying existing ones, begins 
when a member of Congress introduces a bill with her proposed changes to the 
law. That bill is then referred to a specialized committee, and perhaps from 
there to a subcommittee. The committee may then hold hearings and discuss 
the bill, along with other bills on related matters. A small subset of the bills 
introduced emerge from this process, and those that do are often modified in 
the process. A bill that is approved by a majority of committee members is then 
slated for consideration by the full body. The processes are somewhat different 
in the House and Senate, but both generally involve further debate and hear-
ings that are possibly followed by a vote. When both chambers manage to ap-
prove similar bills—they usually approve different versions—the next stage 
involves reconciliation hearings and a compromise text that must again be ap-
proved by a majority of voting members of both houses of Congress. That bill 
must then be signed into law by the President or, if he vetoes the bill, approved 
by two-thirds of the voting members of each house.94 
The aims of these procedures are myriad. The overarching aim of the re-
quirement that laws be passed by democratically elected officials is to promote 
accountability and responsiveness to the public. The unique form of republican 
governance embodied in the Constitution then seeks to accommodate the many 
practical challenges that arise in trying to serve the will of the people. The re-
quirements of bicameral approval and presentment set forth in the Constitution 
are among the checks and balances that help address the fact that government 
officials are fallible.95 The use of committees and other procedural rules also 
serve a number of other aims: from allowing Congress to more effectively 
manage the many issues subject to federal regulation, to enabling some degree 
                                                                                                                           
93 E.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–9001 (2018) (generally outlining the authority of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–9080 (2018) (containing most federal securities laws adminis-
tered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)). 
94 How Laws Are Made and How to Research Them, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/how-laws-
are-made [https://perma.cc/LN48-DEW8]. 
95 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control 
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”). 
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of specialization among members.96 Lawmaking has never been about a first-
best process, but one that entails a range of tradeoffs. 
The frictions that arise from these checks and balances are considerable 
and, in practice, have grown in recent years.97 These frictions are exacerbated 
by the use of committees and other procedures. Political scientists have con-
ceptualized the process using a “vetogate model” that highlights the numerous 
points at which a potential bill can be derailed.98 Unorthodox legislation, from 
emergency legislation passed with far less process or debate to “long and 
messy” omnibus bills, is increasingly common.99 By the same token, legisla-
tive vetoes in which Congress effectively overrides the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of a statute—a sign that Congress is functioning effectively—are on 
the decline.100 And perhaps most discussed, though still contested, is the way 
increased partisanship may be hampering Congress’s capacity to get anything 
done.101 Nonetheless, these processes remain deeply embedded and recent de-
velopments seem more likely to exacerbate than reduce these tensions. 
C. Rulemaking 
Today, most statutes are not complete or self-executing proclamations of 
the law. Instead, they delegate significant authority to administrative agencies 
to make rules and otherwise implement the regimes set forth in statute. The 
Dodd-Frank Act, a detailed, prescriptive piece of legislation totaling 849 pag-
es, is a case in point.102 Within that text, Congress explicitly requires eleven 
different agencies to produce, collectively, 243 new rules, sixty-seven one-time 
reports, and twenty-two new periodic reports.103 Among the reasons for this 
delegation is the desire to harness the technocratic expertise housed within the 
                                                                                                                           
96 Herbert B. Asher, Committees and the Norm of Specialization, 411 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 63, 63 (1974). 
97 See Derek Willis & Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stopped-working [https://perma.cc/EWR5-Z554]. 
98 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGU-
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 53–55 (5th ed. 2014). See generally Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 756 (2012). 
99 See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1789, 1803 (2015). 
100 Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014). 
101 SAM ROSENFELD, THE POLARIZERS: POSTWAR ARCHITECTS OF OUR PARTISAN ERA 3 (2018); 
Thomas E. Mann, Admit It, Political Scientists: Politics Really Is More Broken Than Ever, THE AT-
LANTIC (May 26, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/dysfunction/371544/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q6JK-SXTJ]. 
102 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
103 DAVIS POLK & WARDELL LLP, supra note 3, at ii. 
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federal agencies responsible for administering, monitoring, and enforcing fi-
nancial regulation. 
Like statutory law, the process of introducing or modifying regulations in-
volves numerous procedural requirements. Most of the default procedures that 
agencies must follow are set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).104 
The APA requires that before implementing or modifying a regulation, an agency 
generally must publish its proposed rule, along with background and explanatory 
materials, and invite public comment on that proposal.105 For matters of financial 
regulation, the most thorough and relevant letters are often provided by banks 
and other financial market participants who will be subject to the regulation.106 
The agency will then respond to the substantive issues raised in those comment 
letters when issuing its final, often revised, rule. 
Like statutory lawmaking, these processes serve numerous purposes. As 
explained by Cass Sunstein, “[d]emocratization of the regulatory process, 
through public comment, has an epistemic value.”107 According to Sunstein, 
the public comment requirement “helps to collect dispersed knowledge and to 
bring it to bear on official choices.”108 In addition to being aimed at improving 
the quality of the rules finally issued, this extensive and resource-intensive 
process is also designed to enhance transparency and accountability, allowing 
the public to participate in and understand the reasons behind agency rulemak-
ing. 
Just as with legislation, there is evidence that the regulatory state often 
deviates from this stylized model. Indeed, there is a growing chorus of admin-
istrative law scholars drawing attention to the ways these procedures may ac-
tually inhibit effective regulation. Perhaps most importantly, adherence to strict 
procedural rules ostensibly designed to confer legitimacy and improve substan-
tive rulemaking may exhibit a pronounced status quo bias. Compliance with 
procedural requirements almost by necessity involves delaying regulatory ac-
tion. It also saps agency resources, making it more difficult for agencies to take 
the initiative and respond to new developments. When combined with the na-
ture and pace of change in fields such as finance, this status quo bias is not 
                                                                                                                           
104 See generally Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
105 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
106 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial 
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 58 (2013). 
107 ADAM LOONEY, BROOKINGS INST., HOW TO EFFECTIVELY COMMENT ON REGULATIONS 3 
(Aug. 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ES_20180809_RegComments.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3AGY-GUTD] (quoting Cass Sunstein, Democratizing Regulation, Digitally, 34 
DEMOCRACY J. (Fall 2014), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/34/democratizing-regulation-
digitally/ [https://perma.cc/DVB5-22QV]). 
108 Id. (quoting Sunstein, supra note 107). 
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politically neutral. Rather, these procedural requirements can tip the political 
scales in favor of those who wish to limit state intervention—undercutting the 
legitimacy of the regulatory process and foreclosing potentially desirable poli-
cy alternatives. As Nicholas Bagley argues, the procedural “fetish” in U.S. ad-
ministrative law may thus undermine the very aims it was designed to 
achieve.109 In part because of these concerns, other administrative law scholars 
are laying a critical foundation for thinking more broadly about the type and 
site of procedures that can confer the needed accountability.110 Nevertheless, 
this procedural framework remains mandatory and entrenched.111 
Compounding matters, financial regulators often do, and sometimes must, 
undertake cost-benefit analyses (CBA) of proposed regulations.112 In addition 
to shaping the nature of an agency’s deliberations, CBA can add significant 
costs and introduce other impediments to the rulemaking process.113 Even 
where it is not strictly followed, CBA also reflect an extreme version of the 
assumption underlying so many of the procedural rules used in financial regu-
lation: that it is possible to know, or at least make reasonably well-informed 
assessments of, the myriad effects a regulatory intervention will have on finan-
cial markets and institutions. That leading academics in the law and economics 
movement have decried CBA as counterproductive in the domain of financial 
regulation suggests that processes that may sound reasonable and helpful in the 
abstract can be misguided when applied formulaically in the process of regu-
lating finance.114 Again, however, those processes remain entrenched and are 
widely supported. 
A final source of friction that is particularly pressing in finance arises 
from the architecture of the regulatory system.115 In the United States, this ar-
                                                                                                                           
109 Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 369 (2019). 
110 See generally Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. 
L. REV. 1239 (2017). 
111 See Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 99, at 1792; David Zaring, Administration by Treas-
ury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 203 (2010). 
112 The White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs oversees the CBA for rules is-
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113 See Coates, supra note 112, at 888. 
114 See id. at 888–89; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Fi-
nancial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S353 (2014). 
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chitecture is a byproduct of a time when banking, capital markets, and insur-
ance were largely distinct. This historical anachronism has left the United 
States with two federal market regulators, three federal bank regulators, and no 
federal regulation of insurance, which instead is overseen primarily by the fifty 
states. There are also a number of specialized regulators, such as the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, that oversee the government-sponsored entities that 
provide support to U.S. housing markets. Sometimes, new rules are promulgat-
ed by multiple agencies working together. The Volcker Rule, for example, re-
quired coordination among five different agencies and moved forward more 
slowly as a result.116 More often, each agency continues to shape how it per-
ceives and addresses challenges, and most agencies remain focused on problems 
that fall clearly within their jurisdiction, thereby reducing the amount of atten-
tion paid to developments within the financial system as a whole, or the ways 
actions by one agency may cause problems under the domain of others.117 
D. Supervision 
In addition to being subject to the many rules promulgated through the 
processes described above, banks and many other financial institutions are sub-
ject to ongoing supervision. Supervisors assess compliance with applicable 
regulations, but they have also long enjoyed a broader mandate to promote the 
“safety and soundness” of supervised entities. This seemingly broad authority 
is justified both on the grounds that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) insures deposits at all regulated banks and that bank failures have ad-
verse spillover effects. After the recent crisis, there have also been efforts, most 
notably through regular stress testing, to make bank oversight and the rules to 
which banks are subject more dynamic and forward looking. These are im-
portant components of financial regulation, and ones that can help mitigate the 
mismatch between the dynamism of finance and the efforts to govern it using 
static rules. 
Despite its seeming breadth and flexibility, supervision is mentioned last 
and only briefly because, in practice, it serves more to implement than com-
plement current regulatory frameworks. As the trajectory of financial regula-
tion in the United States has been one of ever more finely tuned rules through 
                                                                                                                           
116 See Keith R. Fisher, Volcker Rule Agencies Issue Interim Final Rule Exempting TruPS-Backed 
CDOS, 67 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 337, 395 (2013). 
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the processes just described, supervision has evolved from a tool that gave 
regulators broad discretion to identify emerging problems to a process that is 
too often focused on ensuring the trees are in order without much attention to 
the broader forest of which they are a part.118 This was all too clear both before 
and after the recent crisis. And supervisors are among the most likely to use 
outmoded frames for understanding the risks before them, thus limiting the po-
tential practical benefits of broad supervision right when it is most needed.119 
E. Where Does This Leave Us? 
Two key policy objectives underpin the costly, complex, and lengthy pro-
cesses governing how financial regulation is currently made in the United 
States. The first is to promote legitimacy and accountability. The second is to 
ensure that new rules will be effective: that they will achieve a desired aim, 
and, ideally, that they are well-tailored to that aim. 
Moving the dynamism, complexity, and unknowns of modern finance 
center stage, however, reveals how ill-suited these processes are to achieve 
those aims. As a threshold matter, these processes are only triggered when 
there is a perceived problem. Sometimes this is a shortcoming exposed by a 
scandal or crisis, and other times it is regulated actors or other affected parties 
advocating for a change.120 Economists, together with the more technocratic 
policymakers they seek to inform, use different language, but often similarly 
focus on problems in isolation. “Market failures” are their diagnostic tool of 
choice: placing problems into established frameworks such as agency costs, 
information asymmetries, coordination problems, or externalities.121 
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By focusing on specific market failures or other perceived flaws, this ap-
proach often results in discussions of issues divorced from the broader ecosys-
tem within which they are situated. The net result is a policy process that too 
often ignores the complex interconnections between financial markets and in-
stitutions, the potential second, third, and fourth order effects of regulatory 
intervention, and the limits of what policymakers can know and understand. In 
short, current processes do not encourage, and may well discourage, attention 
to the bigger picture. 
Accentuating the challenge, the collective inertia generated by these pro-
cedural requirements introduces a significant status quo bias into the policy 
process. Finance moves faster than financial regulation, and the procedural 
requirements meant to promote the public interest can be used by regulated 
actors to influence the direction of the policy process in self-serving ways. The 
status quo bias generated by these procedural requirements thus typically has a 
decidedly deregulatory impact. 
Lastly, where the policy process does result in the introduction of new 
rules, current processes envision that these rules will remain in place even if 
the specific problems they were designed to address no longer exist. And 
where new problems do emerge, they are typically addressed through new in-
terventions—that is, new rules. Importantly, the resulting accretion of rules can 
even be observed during periods of supposed “deregulation.” Indeed, as Helen 
Garten has documented, much of the deregulation that occurred in banking in 
the 1980s took the form of increasingly detailed and more expansive rules, 
each permitting banks to do a little more than they were previously able to do, 
subject to yet additional restrictions on where within their organizations they 
could undertake new activities.122 Paradoxically, deregulation has thus in-
creased the complexity of both financial institutions and financial regula-
tion.123 
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III. FINANCIAL REGULATION IN PRACTICE 
Our discussion thus far has taken place at a fairly high level of abstrac-
tion. Yet even at this level, there appears to be a meaningful tension—a mis-
match—between the core features of the financial system as a domain charac-
terized by complexity, change, and pervasive unknowns, and regulatory pro-
cesses that assume a high degree of knowability, stability, and predictability in 
designing rules that are both effective and legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
This Part moves us closer to the ground in order to demonstrate that this 
mismatch is not just some theoretical problem, but a concrete and pressing 
challenge.124 It begins with two case studies. The first involves rulemaking by 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in response to 
the runs on money market mutual funds at the height of the financial crisis. 
The second involves the sweeping post-crisis reforms to the international capi-
tal and liquidity rules for banks spearheaded by the Basel Committee. To ad-
dress any concern that we have cherry-picked these examples, this Part con-
cludes by looking at how similar challenges are afflicting other post-crisis re-
forms. The aim is not to critique any individual reform, but to assess the extent 
to which the extensive processes through which they were developed achieved 
their desired aims. 
A. Money Market Mutual Fund Reform 
Money market mutual funds—or simply “money market funds”—are in-
vestment funds that invest in cash and other money market instruments. As the 
name suggests, these funds provide investors with a “money-like” investment: 
one that is safe and can be relied on to hold its value.125 The existence of these 
funds is a byproduct of idiosyncrasies in how the United States historically 
regulated banks and markets. Following the Great Depression, Congress intro-
duced deposit insurance for banks, while also imposing significant restrictions 
on what banks could do and how they could do it. This included restrictions, 
embodied in Regulation Q, on the interest rates that banks could pay deposi-
tors.126 This system worked well for several decades.127 When interest rates 
rose significantly in the 1970s, however, depositors were less content accept-
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ing little or no interest in exchange for the safety and liquidity that bank depos-
its promised.128 Money market funds emerged to fill this gap. A product of 
both private creativity and an accommodating regulatory environment, money 
market funds offered higher returns than bank deposits. They grew quickly—to 
the detriment of banks’ liquidity positions—leading in turn to the demise of 
Regulation Q.129 Nonetheless, because banks were still subject to costly regu-
lation, demand for money market funds continued to grow. Throughout, money 
market funds were aided by SEC regulations that permitted them to use a fixed 
$1.00 net asset value (NAV) in exchange for abiding by significant restrictions 
on the duration and quality of the assets they were allowed to hold.130 
Over time, money market funds’ growth changed how banks and other 
firms funded themselves, as highly rated issuers came to rely on them as ready 
buyers of any short-term debt they might issue. All seemed well enough until 
the failure of Lehman Brothers (Lehman) in September 2008.131 Lehman’s col-
lapse caused one of the oldest money market funds to “break that buck,” re-
deeming some of its shares at less than the expected $1.00. Within a week, in-
vestors had withdrawn approximately $300 billion from non-government, or 
“prime,” money market funds, leading to massive disruptions in the short-term 
funding markets.132 The Fed and Treasury Department quickly intervened, with 
each creatively stretching their legal authority to do so.133 These interventions, 
particularly the guarantees provided by Treasury, had the desired effect of re-
storing faith in money market funds and restoring functionality to short-term 
funding markets. That the government had to take such extreme action, how-
ever, suggested the need for reform.134 
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The Dodd-Frank Act did not address money market funds, as the SEC al-
ready had sufficient authority to address the challenges revealed during the 
crisis. When the SEC failed to take meaningful action, the FSOC took the unu-
sual step of seeking public comment on ways to reform money market 
funds.135 This move was designed to, and had the effect of, prompting the SEC 
to pursue more substantive reforms. 
In June 2013, nearly five years after the 2008 run on money market 
funds—and after policymakers had expended significant resources assessing 
how best to proceed—the SEC issued a proposed notice of rulemaking. The 
proposal was 693 pages and included 1,248 footnotes.136 Its focus was on how 
to reform the prime money market funds held by large institutional inves-
tors.137 The SEC received 1,400 comment letters and engaged in numerous 
meetings with industry and other stakeholders over the following year. Alt-
hough 1,200 of those letters were form letters, the remainder were individual-
ized, and often exceptionally detailed.138 They included letters from industry 
participants, trade groups, and law firms, as well as nonfinancial firms, aca-
demics, and others. Public records reveal 108 separate meetings or phone calls 
between SEC commissioners or staff, on the one hand, and stakeholders, in-
cluding SIFMA, Goldman Sachs, Vanguard, Blackrock, the AFL-CIO, Better 
Markets, and UPS, on the other.139 In short, substantial effort was invested in 
this process. 
The SEC issued its final rule just over a year later. The final rule, together 
with supporting material, was 893 pages long and included 2,530 footnotes.140 
It was detailed and, in some regards, exceptionally thorough. In the process of 
explaining its reasons for the final rule, the SEC addressed the myriad and of-
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lease No. 33-9408, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313.shtml [https://perma.cc/9QZD-
6GJM] (last updated July 23, 2014). 
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140 The SEC describes the rule on their website. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to 
Form PF, Corrected to Conform to Federal Register, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9616.
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79 Fed. Reg. 47,736–47,982 (Aug. 14, 2014) (codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.). 
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ten conflicting views that had been expressed in the comment letters received 
regarding the probable effects of the reforms.141 
In the Final Release, the culmination of years of effort and analysis, the 
SEC stated its belief that the reforms would reduce money market funds’ sus-
ceptibility to heavy redemptions, improve their ability to manage contagion, 
and increase the transparency of their risks, while preserving, as much as pos-
sible, their benefits.142 The SEC then went on to explain why. “Market disci-
pline” received significant attention, including 17 separate mentions.143 The 
SEC agreed with many commenters “that daily disclosure [that is, a floating 
NAV] will increase market discipline, which could ultimately deter situations 
that could lead to heavy redemptions.”144 The hope was that if money market 
funds provide more detailed information about the value of their assets, and 
that even small value changes affect the price investors receive when redeem-
ing their shares, those investors would pressure mutual fund managers to be 
more conservative in their holdings, reducing the risk and the likelihood of 
future runs. 
The SEC and numerous letter writers also acknowledged the possibility of 
broader, systemic ramifications. One big question was whether institutional 
investors would continue to hold prime money market funds once the changes, 
like floating NAVs, were implemented. The SEC identified more than a dozen 
alternative instruments that institutional investors might choose instead of 
money market funds. It ultimately concluded that “some outflow” was likely 
but that it was “not able to estimate” how much. The SEC said that “[g]iven 
the heterogeneity of investors’ preferences and investment objectives and con-
straints,” there was no expectation that investors would relocate their assets in 
the same alternative instrument.145 In short, they expected that the changes 
would cause some investors to seek out substitutes, but they could not hazard a 
guess as to how many, and they thought that different investors would seek 
different alternatives. They reached an even more equivocal non-conclusion 
regarding the macroeconomic effects of the reforms.146 
In hindsight, it is notable that the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) 
were mentioned only once in the entire Release.147 Specifically, the FHLBanks 
were mentioned in a footnote identifying the various types of securities in 
                                                                                                                           
141 79 Fed. Reg. at 47,736–47,982. 
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146 Id. at 47,910 (“[W]e acknowledge changes in the market arising from the reforms may have 
macroeconomic effects in the future” but “[b]ecause we cannot foresee all of the ways markets will 
evolve, we cannot predict [those] . . . effects.”). 
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which government money market funds—not “prime” funds—are permitted to 
invest.”148 The FHLBanks, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are government-
sponsored enterprises created after the Depression to facilitate home owner-
ship. Today, the primary way that the FHLBanks purport to do this is by mak-
ing loans to member banks and insurance companies collateralized by mort-
gage-related assets. The FHLBanks fund these loans by issuing debt through 
the FHLBank Office of Finance, for which all of the FHLBanks are jointly 
liable. The federal government does not explicitly guarantee the debt they is-
sue, but it is widely believed that the government would step in to protect that 
debt if needed.149 Because investors had run into—rather than out of—
government money market funds in 2008, the SEC had not seen any reason to 
revise the rules governing those funds, which could still use the $1.00 fixed 
NAV. This was the product of years of dialogue and input from government 
bodies, industry, think tanks, and academics. This was the process that was 
meant to improve the quality of the final rule and ensure its legitimacy by al-
lowing robust and public discussion of the issues at stake. 
The new rules became effective two years after being finalized, in Octo-
ber 2016.150 The response of investors was immediate and unequivocal. At the 
beginning of 2014, before the reforms were finalized, there was nearly $950 
billion invested in the prime money market fund affected by the reforms.151 By 
the time the rule was fully implemented that number had plummeted to just 
over $120 billion.152 It turns out that the features the SEC identified as making 
money market funds vulnerable were ones that most investors were not willing 
to forego. Rather than turning to a diverse array of alternatives as the SEC had 
predicted, however, investors moved virtually all of those funds into the exact 
same alternative: government money market funds not subject to the new 
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rules.153 The total assets invested in money market funds thus remained fairly 
constant; it was the allocation of these assets among those funds that changed 
dramatically. 
The spike in flows into government money market funds was made pos-
sible by a dramatic increase in the issuance of short-term debt instruments by 
the FHLBanks. Between the end of 2015 and the end of 2017, the value of 
short-term floating notes issued by the FHLBank system increased from $80 
billion, or 8.9% of total bonds and notes outstanding, to $297 billion, or 
29.2%.154 In other words, the FHLBanks more than tripled their reliance on the 
type of short-term debt most useful to money market funds.155 Because most of 
the loans they issue are of a longer duration, the reliance exposed FHLBanks 
to a greater maturity mismatch on their balance sheets. The size of their bal-
ance sheets also grew.156 This was in part a response to the increased demand 
for FHLBank debt arising out of spurred reforms, but also to new liquidity re-
quirements imposed on banks that increased their demand for longer term 
funding of the kind the FHLBanks can provide.157 There was thus an interac-
tion between, on the one hand, the SEC’s reforms, and on the other, the new 
rules promulgated by the Basel Committee and implemented by the Fed, that 
collectively brought about changes on both sides of the balance sheet of the 
FHLBank system. Needless to say, the FHLBanks are overseen by the Federal 
Housing Finance Authority, thus falling outside the jurisdiction of both the 
SEC and the bank regulators responsible for implementing the new liquidity 
rules. 
Putting these pieces together, the net effect of the SEC’s reforms has thus 
far been to position the FHLBanks between banks and money market funds. 
Instead of raising capital by issuing short-term debt that was then held by 
money market funds, banks today borrow more from FHLBanks, which then 
loan the money onto banks. Thus, rather than increasing market discipline, the 
reforms seem to have reduced it. Additionally, the reforms have contributed to 
a FHLBank system that is both larger and—owing to the greater maturity 
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mismatch—more fragile. Institutional investors now generally hold govern-
ment money market funds instead of prime funds, but otherwise hold effective-
ly the same product as they did before the reforms.158 
The effects of the SEC’s reforms are thus mixed. Money market funds 
probably are more stable. Yet this has happened in significant part by increas-
ing the government footprint. Government guarantees, even if implicit, often 
help enhance stability. But they can also undermine market discipline and in-
crease the likelihood of taxpayer losses. The increased size and fragility of the 
FHLBanks also raise a host of questions about their oversight and opera-
tions.159 
Our aim here is not to resolve these policy questions, but to point out that 
these are among the most important—and contestable—questions raised by the 
actual effect of the SEC’s reforms. Nonetheless, they were not among the nu-
merous issues debated by policymakers, industry participants, and other stake-
holders before the reforms were adopted. Despite the years of study and de-
bate, the possibility that the FHLBank system would grow, evolve, and assume 
additional risks to satisfy new demand for government money market funds 
was not even mentioned in the nearly 900 pages and more than 2,500 footnotes 
of the Final Release. 
It would be easy to fault the SEC for this, but the SEC was not alone in its 
failure.160 One aim of the lengthy, resource-intensive process that the SEC un-
dertook before adopting the reforms was to glean insights from market partici-
pants, academics, and other stakeholders. The materials these stakeholders 
provided were voluminous and detailed, and yet they too seem to have missed 
the mark. The lack of discussion of these ultimately pivotal issues is thus a 
failure of the processes meant to inform the SEC, not one specific to the insti-
tutional competence of the SEC itself. 
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Also noteworthy is the fact that, now that we have high-quality, accurate 
information about the impact of these reforms, the window for discussion is 
largely closed. Some policymakers, researchers, and think tanks have drawn 
attention to these dynamics, but there is little concerted discussion of whether 
the changes wrought by the SEC’s reforms are desirable—let alone whether 
they demand a further regulatory response. The frictions that would impede 
any change to the new rules, along with exhaustion from the effort already ex-
pended, are likely among the factors contributing to this inertia. 
Before leaving this case study, it is worth emphasizing the relevance of 
the events leading up to the crisis to our analysis. Money market funds were a 
core component of the shadow banking system and enabled that system to use 
short-term money-like liabilities to fund longer term illiquid assets like home 
loans. They did not grow in the “shadows” in the sense of being out of sight. 
Their growth was widely observed, discussed, and facilitated by SEC regula-
tions.161 They were in the shadows only in the limited, albeit very important, 
sense of being outside the perimeter of the prudential regulatory regime gov-
erning banks and other institutions known to pose systemic risks. This was 
both because of, and a contributing factor to, the failure of policymakers to 
appreciate their systemic significance. 
B. The Basel Capital and Liquidity Requirements 
Shifting from shadow banks to banks provides further insight into how 
dynamism, complexity, and unknowns contribute to a fundamental mismatch 
between finance and financial regulation. Capital requirements—rules govern-
ing how banks finance their activities—have long been a cornerstone of bank 
regulation. The basic function of these requirements is simple. Because equity 
can absorb losses, utilizing more equity makes banks better able to withstand 
declining asset prices, thus reducing both the probability and potential impact 
of bank failure. Thicker capital cushions may also help to assure depositors 
and other short-term creditors of a bank’s health, thereby reducing the proba-
bility of a run.162 
In practice, however, there are several reasons why shareholders and 
managers may prefer debt over equity.163 First, issuing short-term debt-like 
deposits is not just how banks fund themselves, it is their product—it is what 
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they are designed to do.164 Second, debt often enjoys certain tax advantages.165 
Third, shareholders may seek to use debt—and short-term debt in particular—
as a commitment mechanism to help address potential agency problems vis-à-
vis bank managers.166 Fourth, bank managers may prefer debt because it me-
chanically increases a bank’s return on equity, a common metric for perfor-
mance-based compensation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, explicit 
and implicit government backing for the debt that banks issue lowers the cost 
of debt relative to equity.167 Viewed from this perspective, minimum capital 
requirements serve as a counterweight to the incentives of shareholders, man-
agers, and creditors to operate with dangerously low levels of loss-absorbing 
capital. They also mitigate the moral hazard generated by the expectation of 
government support and help address the fact that the government can never 
credibly commit to not support banks given the massive costs that banking 
panics can impose on the real economy. 
The Basel Committee published the first international capital standards in 
1988. The U.S. government then incorporated the standards into federal law, 
phasing them in between 1989 and 1992.168 Even before the ink was dry, ob-
servers were pointing out flaws in the Basel framework.169 In particular, Basel 
I adopted a crude approach to risk-weighting bank assets for the purposes of 
calculating minimum capital requirements, one that essentially divided the en-
tire universe of financial assets into four categories—or “buckets”—based on 
their perceived riskiness. This presented banks with a relatively straightfor-
ward arbitrage opportunity. Specifically, by investing in the riskiest assets in 
any given bucket, banks could take more risks, and presumably generate more 
profits, while being required to hold the exact same amount of capital. 
Introduced in 2004, Basel II sought to eliminate this arbitrage opportunity 
by permitting larger and more sophisticated banks to calculate their own risk 
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weights under the “internal ratings-based” (or IRB) approach. In a nutshell, the 
IRB approach enabled banks to use their own internal computer models, his-
torical default rates, and other market data to generate the key input variables 
necessary to calculate minimum capital requirements for both their loan and 
trading books.170 In addition to eliminating the arbitrage opportunities present-
ed by Basel I, the introduction of the IRB approach appears to have been moti-
vated by a desire on the part of bank regulators to ensure that capital require-
ments were as “accurate” as possible, i.e., that they reflected institutional and 
market-based assessments of credit, market, and other risks.171 
The Basel II implementation coincided with the outbreak of the 2007–
2009 crisis, which in turn exposed the flaws in the IRB approach. As a prelim-
inary matter, the crisis demonstrated that financial models based on historical 
data are vulnerable to small sample errors and the under-estimation of so-
called “tail” risks.172 The wide variance in risk-weighting methodologies also 
stoked concerns that banks were using their discretion over important input 
variables to reduce their capital requirements.173 And most importantly, the 
crisis demonstrated that market-based measures of credit, market, and other 
risks cannot capture the systemic risks arising from the various complex, 
opaque, and interconnected activities undertaken by banks and other financial 
institutions.174 Banks’ risk-management systems and the regulatory schemes 
relying on them failed, in part because the world was complicated and dynamic 
in ways their models could not capture. 
Predictably, the crisis was followed by yet another overhaul of the Basel 
framework. First published in 2010—and revised in 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016 
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and 2017—Basel III introduces a number of significant reforms.175 In the 
realm of bank capital, these reforms include refinements to the definition and 
categories of capital, new countercyclical capital and capital conservation 
buffers, and a capital surcharge for global systemically important banks.176 The 
Basel Committee has also responded to the threat that banks might manipulate 
the IRB approach by introducing a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio and, more 
recently, risk-weight floors for credit, market, and operational risks.177 The 
target date for full implementation of Basel III was originally January 1, 
2019—almost a full decade after these new standards were first published.178 
Many of the more recent reforms, including the new risk-weight floors, are not 
scheduled for full implementation until 2027.179 
The first thing that the thirty-year arc between Basel I and III makes clear 
is the pervasive and unpredictable impact of regulatory arbitrage. Despite the 
time, effort, and other resources committed to designing and refining the Basel 
framework, each iteration has been undercut by banks’ efforts to limit its im-
pact and effectiveness. Much of the evolution of the Basel framework could be 
cast as a process of policymakers’ ongoing—and often unsuccessful—attempts 
to curb regulatory arbitrage. Given the time lag between the publication of new 
Basel standards and their implementation into domestic law, banks will likely 
find new ways of arbitraging Basel III long before these reforms come into full 
force and effect.180 On our present course, it is therefore only a matter of time 
before we see another round of fundamental capital reforms. There are very 
good reasons to regulate bank capital, and having better capitalized banks 
should enhance systemic stability. Additionally, reforms like the simple lever-
age ratio are meant to address the dynamism and unknowns identified here to 
be a core challenge for financial regulation. Nonetheless, the specific processes 
that the Basel Committee has employed to try to improve capital regulation 
have consistently generated unintended consequences, while often leaving 
banks undercapitalized when it matters most. 
Crucially, regulatory arbitrage of the Basel framework has been an im-
portant driver of both dynamism and complexity. The development of struc-
tured finance provides an illustrative example. Among the many reasons for 
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the rise of structured finance during the 1990s was the fact that selling mort-
gages and other loans into bankruptcy-remote entities provided sponsoring 
banks with relief from capital requirements.181 The forces of regulatory arbi-
trage thus contributed to the emergence and development of a complex finan-
cial ecosystem within which risks were often highly fragmented, but where—
sometimes unbeknownst to regulators—contingent obligations buried deep 
within the documentation exposed sponsoring banks to the risk of widespread 
market disruption.182 Perversely, then, the very rules designed to ensure the 
stability of banks helped spur the creation of new markets, institutions, and 
instruments that made it more difficult for regulators to detect the build-up of 
potential systemic risks within the banking system. 
How policymakers have responded to the threat of regulatory arbitrage 
has also contributed to the complexity of banking regulation. Historically, the 
Basel Committee has responded to this threat by writing detailed rules de-
signed to close the gaps exploited by banks for the purposes of reducing their 
capital requirements.183 The resulting rulification is reflected in the ever in-
creasing length of the Basel framework: while Basel I was articulated in a crisp 
30 pages, Basel II ran to 347 pages, and Basel III came out at a staggering 616 
pages.184 In the United States, the legislation and regulations implementing 
Basel III came out at over 1,000 pages.185 The problem is that adopting new, 
more detailed, and more complex rules invites banks to find new, more be-
spoke, and more complex ways of getting around them.186 It is therefore un-
surprising that attempts to combat regulatory arbitrage with yet more detailed 
regulation have led to an exponential increase in the size and complexity of the 
Basel rulebook without necessarily yielding any commensurate increase in its 
effectiveness. As Andy Haldane and Vasileios Madouros have observed: “the 
regulatory response to the crisis has largely been based on the level of thinking 
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that created it.”187 Thus, “[t]he Tower of Basel, like its near-namesake the 
Tower of Babel, continues to rise.”188 
The rulification of the Basel framework has also increased the probability 
that rules will interact in unexpected and potentially harmful ways.189 Econo-
mists Robin Greenwood and coauthors, for example, have demonstrated how 
the combination of market-based risk-weighting methodologies (introduced 
under Basel II) with a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio (introduced under Ba-
sel III) can incentivize banks to shift into lines of business where they are less 
competitive and, conversely, lead them to eschew lines of business where they 
possess a comparative advantage.190 Greenwood and his coauthors see two 
reasons to be worried about these findings. First, the interaction between these 
different regulatory requirements may spur banks to enter businesses where 
they have little historical expertise, existing capabilities, or risk-management 
infrastructure.191 Second, insofar as these requirements drive banks to adopt 
similar business models, this could increase the risk of correlated undercapital-
ization during periods of market turmoil.192 In this way, the incremental build-
up of well-intentioned rules can both engender significant changes within the 
financial system and potentially sow the seeds of future instability. 
Lastly, the Basel framework has contributed to the cyclicality of finance. 
Perhaps the best example is the introduction of a risk-weighting methodology 
under Basel II.193 As described above, Basel II tied the amount of capital that 
banks must hold to the riskiness of the assets in their portfolios. Under the IRB 
approach, banks could then calculate the riskiness of these assets using their 
own data on historical default rates and market volatility. During periods of 
economic expansion, the relatively low level of defaults and muted volatility 
would translate into lower capital requirements—enabling banks to extend 
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more credit on the basis of the same level of capital. In this way, capital re-
quirements would reinforce economic booms and, potentially, contribute to the 
formation of asset and credit bubbles. When these bubbles burst, risk- 
weighted capital requirements would also reinforce the resulting economic 
contraction, thus forcing banks to raise more capital during periods of relative-
ly high volatility, reduce lending, or sell portfolio assets to shore up their bal-
ance sheets. 
Many of these same challenges can also be observed in connection with 
new liquidity rules introduced under Basel III. Many view the acute liquidity 
problems that banks and other financial institutions experienced as the root of 
the crisis.194 In response, the Basel Committee introduced two new liquidity 
rules: the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR).195 The LCR is designed to ensure that banks have a sufficient stock of 
high-quality liquid assets to survive a hypothetical thirty-day stress scenario.196 
The NSFR, meanwhile, is designed to constrain the reliance of banks on un-
stable, short-term sources of wholesale funding.197 
While the rationale for both the LCR and NSFR may seem relatively 
straightforward, their design and implementation have proven to be challeng-
ing. The OFR, for example, has suggested that the complexity of the LCR, at 
least as adopted in the United States, serves to undermine its utility as a 
benchmark for evaluating a bank’s liquidity position.198 There is also some 
evidence, and much concern, that the LCR may be reducing the amount of li-
quidity creation and transformation being performed by banks and other finan-
cial institutions.199 And as noted above, the LCR is among the forces interact-
ing with recent money market mutual fund reforms to spur the growth of the 
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FHLBank system.200 It is also changing the types of banks that are borrowing 
from FHLBanks, leading to more borrowing by the largest banks, and thus po-
tentially engendering competition among them.201 Meanwhile, full implemen-
tation has been delayed in part based on concerns about potential unintended 
consequences, along with its possible impact on bank profitability.202 Thus, 
despite the best of intentions, it is still far from clear whether the new Basel 
liquidity rules will ultimately have the desired impact. 
Just how little we know about the potential impact of the new Basel li-
quidity rules is evident from the debate surrounding the causes of recent insta-
bility in the U.S. “repo” market. For several days in September 2019, interest 
rates within short-term “repo” markets experienced a short, sharp spike—from 
roughly 2% to a high of 10%.203 This spike coincided with both the end of the 
corporate tax year and a significant new issuance of U.S. government debt, 
both foreseeable events that the Fed should have been able to manage. Observ-
ers have advanced a number of different explanations for this spike. One ex-
planation is that new capital and liquidity rules may have made banks more 
hesitant to engage in the arbitrage that should have normally moderated this 
type of instability.204 Others have blamed the Fed’s policy of paying banks’ 
interest on excess reserves.205 Whatever the explanation, this instability ulti-
mately ended with the Fed injecting over one hundred billion dollars into the 
market. We do not have any deep insight into the actual causes, but the Fed’s 
inability to predict and avoid a spike of this magnitude and the degree of con-
testation over the reasons for it are themselves indications of just how complex 
and costly the current regime is, both in terms of outcomes and accountability. 
The dynamism and complexity of modern finance, together with the poor-
ly understood feedback effects between capital requirements and bank behav-
ior, generate significant unknowns. Indeed, for all the technocratic expertise 
that has gone into the design of the Basel framework—including several at-
                                                                                                                           
200 See supra notes 125–161 and accompanying text. 
201 Gissler & Narajabad, supra note 158. 
202 King, supra note 197, at 4145. 
203 Joe Rennison & Laura Noonan, Week of Repo Turmoil Puts Wall Street Traders in a Spin, FIN. 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fa14c286-db59-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17 [https://
perma.cc/6PZA-CFYH]. 
204 See, e.g., Erik Sherman, The Fed’s Repo Market Bailout Is a Sign of Deeper Problems—That 
Are Getting Worse Over Time, FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/09/26/the-feds-
repo-market-bailout-is-a-sign-of-deeper-problems-that-are-getting-worse-over-time/ [https://perma.
cc/EFE6-PVCV] (explaining how the LCR in particular may have prevented banks from providing 
liquidity to the marketplace). 
205 This appears to be the view adopted by the Fed itself, which responded to the recent instability 
by reducing the amount of interest it pays on excess reserves. See Jeff Cox, Fed Cuts Rate on Bank 
Reserves Amid Repo Market Turmoil, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/18/fed-
ioer-fed-cuts-rate-on-bank-reserves-amid-repo-turmoil.html [https://perma.cc/U7W5-9CQ5]. 
2020] Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short 2337 
tempts to empirically quantify its costs and benefits—there is still remarkably 
little agreement around many seemingly basic questions. Perhaps most im-
portantly, while something of a consensus has started to emerge around the 
need for stringent capital requirements, there is considerably less agreement 
around the precise benefits and costs of imposing higher capital requirements 
on banks and other large financial institutions, the tradeoffs of having multiple 
different constraints, and the value of having liquidity constraints alongside the 
capital requirements.206 
The ongoing evolution of the Basel capital requirements demonstrates, 
yet again, just how much faster finance moves relative to financial regulation. 
More importantly, it demonstrates how conventional approaches to financial 
regulation are poorly equipped to address the challenges stemming from the 
dynamism, complexity and unknowns of the financial system. Although capital 
can help protect against unknowns and uncertainty, layered capital require-
ments can exacerbate those very dynamics. Examining the history of capital 
requirements—how they have evolved and how banks have responded to 
them—reveals significant failings in the processes through which these re-
quirements are promulgated, enforced, and revised. 
C. Broadening the Lens 
Taking a step back from our two case studies reveals that this mismatch 
between finance and financial regulation is not an isolated phenomenon. In 
fact, we could have just as easily picked any number of post-crisis reforms. 
The details inevitably vary, but these reforms have almost universally generat-
ed effects—some positive, others less so—that, despite the breadth and depth 
of the policy process leading up to their adoption, were unforeseen. Take, for 
example, mandatory central clearing of derivatives. To facilitate netting and 
promote transparency, the United States and other countries now require stand-
ardized derivatives to be cleared through centralized clearinghouses.207 To be 
sure, mandatory clearing may have yielded many of the expected gains, but it 
has simultaneously increased the size and systemic importance of clearing-
houses, thus effectively creating new nodes of systemic risk.208 It has also con-
tributed to the massive growth and concentration of the largest clearinghouses 
and reduced market discipline among clearing members, who now have less 
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direct exposure to the default of other clearing members.209 These and other 
developments raise real questions about the authority and role of regulators 
should something go wrong.210 
Another example is the controversial Volcker Rule, a provision of the 
Dodd-Frank Act that prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading.211 
From the outset, commentators questioned whether activities that were not ob-
viously tied to the causes of the crisis should be targeted for reform.212 The 
rule took years to finalize, is massively complex, and imposes significant com-
pliance costs on banks. Indeed, Volcker himself has lamented its complexity.213 
Initially viewed by its sponsors as a modern-day version of the (initially far 
simpler) separation of commercial and investment banking under the Glass-
Steagall Act, the rule ultimately morphed into something nobody in Congress 
had envisioned.214 There have also been fears, and mixed evidence, that the 
rule may be adversely affecting liquidity in the bond market.215 At the same 
time, others now see benefits of the rule that they did not anticipate in advance. 
For example, the rule may have a greater capacity to change who wants to 
work at a bank and to alter the overall risk-taking culture of banks than initial-
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ly appreciated.216 Just as we saw in the case of capital requirements, it often 
takes time to understand why a rule is working even when it yields real bene-
fits. Even then, the longer term consequences of reform remain difficult to as-
sess. 
Going back to the original Glass-Steagall separation between commercial 
and investment banks reveals a similar learning curve. According to Senator 
Glass, one of the rationales for the separation stemmed from the conflicts of in-
terest arising from allowing commercial banks to underwrite corporate securi-
ties.217 Not until much later did empirical investigation of the quality of pre-
Glass-Steagall securities issued by universal banks cast doubt on this rationale—
helping fuel the case for its repeal.218 After the recent crisis, however, academics 
began looking for better explanations of why the United States’ financial system 
had been so stable for the fifty years following the Great Depression. This re-
examination produced an array of credible, alternative rationales for why Glass-
Steagall may have been very helpful in promoting financial stability. Professor 
Adam Levitin, for example, has suggested that the “unintended genius of Glass-
Steagall” was that the structural separation of commercial banks, investment 
banks, and insurance companies broke up the political power of the financial 
services industry.219 Glass-Steagall, in other words, created sophisticated, in-
formed, and well-funded industry participants on both sides of many regulatory 
debates, forming a more balanced and productive setup for future lawmaking. 
Economist Joseph Stiglitz later argued that “[t]he most important consequence of 
the repeal of Glass–Steagall was . . . the way repeal changed an entire cul-
ture.”220 In his assessment, the unappreciated benefit of Glass-Steagall was that 
it made commercial banks more boring—and thereby more stable—by making 
them unattractive places for risk-seeking financiers.221 Professor Arthur Wil-
marth, who has advocated for the return to Glass-Steagall, has similarly suggest-
ed that the competitive pressures that push financiers toward greater risk-taking 
are exacerbated by the universal banking model.222 
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The aim here is not to seek answers to these difficult questions or to 
weigh in on any particular policy issue. Rather, these examples highlight the 
existence of meaningful gaps between the discourse around these rules when 
they were first adopted and the effect of these rules once in place. Time and 
again, the processes designed to encourage informed debate, enhance the 
quality of adopted rules, and promote buy-in from stakeholders have failed to 
reveal what has later proved to be among the most critical issues. This is im-
portant not only because it means excessive resources are being invested ex 
ante, or that potentially counterproductive frictions are imposed on changing 
existing rules, but because it means there is in practice often no process allow-
ing for meaningful discussion of the actual issues at stake. Hence those lauda-
tory aims, from efficacy to legitimacy, too often go unfulfilled. 
IV. SOME PROGRESS 
We are far from the first to observe that dynamism, complexity, and un-
knowns are core features of modern financial systems. Nor are we the first to 
raise concerns about the many challenges they create for financial regulation. 
This Part briefly surveys some of the post-crisis reforms and other efforts un-
derway to address these dynamics.223 It then considers some of the proposals 
and models already on the table for addressing these challenges. The focus 
here is on why our central claim—that the mismatch between finance and finan-
cial regulation helps to explain why financial regulation so often has failed in the 
past and will likely fail again in the years ahead—remains pressing despite these 
developments. On both fronts, we engage with a thin but hopefully representa-
tive slice of the relevant activity and ideas. This analysis suggests that despite 
some progress, both analytically and on the ground, the core mismatch remains 
and the challenges it imposes are as great, if not greater, than ever. 
A. Reforms Underway 
1. Harnessing New Technology and Data Standardization 
One way to tackle the challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and 
unknowns is for policymakers to take better advantage of technological ad-
vancements in the realm of data collection and analysis. These approaches 
have the potential to reduce the effective unknowns and make complexity and 
dynamism more manageable by enhancing market participants’ and regulators’ 
abilities to monitor developments and the systemic implications of changes in 
a more timely and comprehensive fashion. Closer examination of the post-
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crisis efforts to develop and ensure widespread use of well-designed data 
standards supports this promise, but also brings to the fore the pragmatic chal-
lenges and current limits of using technology to tackle these challenges. 
The good news is that in the wake of the crisis, there have been a number 
of initiatives designed to leverage new technologies to collect and analyze data 
and to standardize data to make it more usable. A prominent example is the 
legal entity identifier (LEI) initiative. An LEI is a twenty-character, alpha-
numeric code that connects to key reference information about legal entities 
participating in financial transactions.224 Each LEI contains information about 
an entity’s ownership structure and thus answers the questions of “who is who” 
and “who owns whom.” Over a longer time horizon, this information could be 
integrated with unique product identifiers (UPIs) linked to key reference in-
formation about individual financial products—from basic equity and debt to 
derivatives and other more exotic instruments—thus answering the question of 
“who owns what.”225 LEIs and UPIs would then work together—with LEIs 
gathering information about the parties and UPIs recording the relevant specif-
ics of the transactions.226 
In theory, these types of developments, particularly if used in conjunction 
with other new technologies, hold out a number of potentially significant bene-
fits. More granular and standardized data can help regulators aggregate, ma-
nipulate, and compare firm-level data with the objective of identifying poten-
tial microprudential risks. This data can also be aggregated to help regulators 
identify and monitor risks across sectors and over time, thus potentially be-
coming a critical first step to more effective macroprudential oversight. More 
effective use of new technologies, along with more comprehensive data stand-
ardization, would thus give regulators more lead time to design effective, effi-
cient, and appropriately tailored ways of addressing these risks and could 
prove particularly useful in crisis management. Together, technology and data 
standards can therefore be viewed as the building blocks of a more accurate 
and complete map of the myriad of complex and dynamic interactions within 
the financial system. 
Shifting from theory to practice, however, reveals a different state of af-
fairs. There has been some progress in data standardization and related efforts 
to cut through the complexity of the financial system, but this progress has 
been “slow, hard won, and, in many areas, elusive.”227 Even low-cost im-
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provements, like full adoption of the LEI, have yet to be achieved in the Unit-
ed States despite having been mandated throughout Europe.228 If anything, the 
low priority given to the basic building blocks necessary to realize the promise 
of new technologies, such as data standardization, reveals just how far from 
ideal the current regulatory process remains.229 More generally, although the 
“fintech” and “regtech” movements,230 as well as standardization, are likely to 
be critical to addressing complexity, dynamism, and unknowns, doing so will 
require a very different framework for congressional and public involvement. 
Looking at the potential here provides more reason for concern about the cur-
rent processes undergirding financial regulation. 
2. Stress Testing 
One of the most important crisis-era regulatory innovations has been the 
introduction of “stress testing” for the largest banking organizations. Stress 
testing involves the use of hypothetical scenarios envisioning significant eco-
nomic and financial shocks in order to assess how banks would fare under 
those conditions and, at times, to assess the robustness of the internal systems 
that banks use to monitor and constrain their own risk-taking. The Fed con-
ducted the first large-scale supervisory stress tests in 2009, which proved criti-
cal to restoring the faith of market participants in the health of the largest bank 
holding companies. Today, stress testing involves two separate but comple-
mentary processes: the Dodd-Frank mandated stress tests (DFAST) and the 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). Where these tests re-
veal significant weaknesses, banks may be prohibited from making distribu-
tions to shareholders, thereby increasing their capital. 
The institutionalization of stress testing suggests a growing appreciation 
of dynamism and unknowns and the need for new tools to address these chal-
lenges. Stress tests are forward-looking exercises that, when well executed, can 
illuminate weaknesses in risk management systems, latent capital deficiencies, 
and other dynamics not readily identified under more traditional approaches to 
capital regulation or supervision. In many ways, they mark an important step 
forward. By making capital requirements more responsive to the unique risks 
banks are exposed to, and demonstrating how and when things can go wrong, 
these exercises introduce helpful dynamism into the prudential regulatory re-
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gime. They can also help mitigate gamesmanship of capital adequacy require-
ments.231 
The growing gap between finance and financial regulation helps explain 
why stress testing is such a welcome new development and provides further 
support for its continued and expanded use.232 A closer examination of stress 
testing, however, reveals another gap—this one between theory and practice. 
As a preliminary matter, the DFAST and CCAR stress tests only apply to a 
relatively narrow subset of financial institutions, i.e., conventional deposit-
taking banks. Moreover, much like data standardization, this tool’s potential to 
address the challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and unknowns de-
pends a great deal on the mindset and assumptions of the regulators in-
volved.233 In this respect, recent statements by Fed officials are not encourag-
ing. When announcing the results of the 2017 tests, for example, Fed Chairman 
Jerome Powell stated that the “results show that, even during a severe reces-
sion, our large banks would remain well capitalized” such that they are able to 
“lend throughout the economic cycle, and support households and businesses 
when times are tough.”234 In response to the 2019 tests, this view was echoed 
by Randal Quarles, the Vice-Chairman of the Fed in charge of banking super-
vision, when he stated that “the results confirm that our financial system re-
mains resilient” and that “[t]he nation’s largest banks . . . would be well posi-
tioned to support the economy even after a severe shock.”235 
Other leading figures have questioned these conclusions. Former Treasury 
Secretary Lawrence Summers, for example, recently observed “that recent 
stress tests estimate that if GDP drops 6.25[%], unemployment doubles, the 
stock market halves, and real estate falls by 25[%] to 30[%], then capital losses 
would be insufficient to trigger [regulatory intervention].”236 He went on to say 
that these conclusions are “more of a comment on the inadequacies of the 
                                                                                                                           
231 See generally HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING (J. Doyne Farmer, Alissa Kleinni-
jenhuis, Til Schuermann & Thom Wetzer eds., forthcoming 2020). 
232 Id. 
233 Paul Krugman, The 2008 Financial Crisis as Seen from the Top, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/books/review/ben-bernanke-timothy-geithner-henry-paulson-
firefighting.html [https://perma.cc/4RP8-6EV8]. 
234 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Board Releases Results of Supervisory Bank 
Stress Tests (June 22, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20170
622a.htm [https://perma.cc/4DKC-X75J]. 
235 John Heltman, Banks Sail Through Year’s First Round of Stress Tests, AM. BANKER (June 21, 
2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/banks-sail-through-years-first-round-of-stress-tests 
[https://perma.cc/97CN-JCDL]. 
236 Lawrence H. Summers, Larry Summers: 5 Suggestions for Avoiding Another Banking Col-
lapse, WASH. POST (May 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/05/22/
larry-summers-5-suggestions-for-avoiding-another-banking-collapse/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.
08135b761dec [https://perma.cc/YX2W-5F2A] (crediting his colleague Jeremy Bulow with first mak-
ing this point). 
2344 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1 
stress test procedures, than on the soundness of the banks.”237 Summers’s 
comments reflect an acknowledgement of the fact that the stress tests rely 
heavily on models and assumptions that inevitably fail to capture the full range 
of dynamics that will be at play in the thick of the next recession or financial 
crisis. 
We can frame the significance of these two competing views by consider-
ing, briefly, the role of “humility” in making accurate forecasts—including 
stress tests. Philip Tetlock, one of the leading scholars on forecasting, has 
demonstrated that experts are often exceptionally bad forecasters.238 His work 
on forecasting provides an array of relevant insights into the mindsets that en-
able more accurate forecasting.239 One of the most important of these mindsets 
is humility. In Tetlock’s telling, humility is not false modesty or a lack of con-
fidence, as commonly conceived. Rather, it means understanding what one 
knows and what one does not.240 
In theory, stress testing could well foster this type of humility. One of the 
important features of the current stress testing process is that banks run their own 
independent tests alongside those conducted by the Fed itself. Disparities in the 
results of these could serve as a reminder of the inherent limitations of any risk 
management framework. This is just the type of thinking that our analysis sug-
gests is critical. But the statements by Powell and Quarles suggest a very differ-
ent mindset, one that views the results as confirmations of how good things are 
and how much they know—precisely the type of thinking that contributed to the 
failure of regulators to foresee the cracks ahead of the last crisis.241 Stress tests 
are an important new tool in helping to mitigate the challenges this paper places 
front and center, but untethered from an appreciation of those challenges, they 
could do as much harm as good in preventing the next crisis. 
3. Macroprudential Policies 
Another post-crisis shift that would, in theory, seem even more responsive 
to the challenges revealed here is the rise of a “macroprudential” tool for finan-
cial regulation.242 Macroprudential oversight was meant to address systemic risk 
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that could not be detected, and may be accentuated, by an excessive focus on the 
constitutive components of the financial system apart from the broader ecosys-
tem in which they operate. Yet, unlike their counterparts abroad, United States 
policymakers have been given few of the tools needed to implement macropru-
dential policies.243 Moreover, the notion of macroprudential oversight has 
evolved, in many circles, from encouraging critical and creative thinking about 
the workings of the financial system as a whole to focusing on a narrower set of 
specific policies, often reducing borrower leverage.244 And as we have seen, 
these very policies are now being recognized as potential triggers of behavioral 
changes that have effects elsewhere in the financial system.245 Thus, in a manner 
akin to the rise of stress testing, the rise of a macroprudential approach reflects 
an implicit understanding that the complexity, dynamism, and unknowns that 
characterize finance undermine traditional approaches to financial regulation. 
Yet, divorced from a recognition of the need for more fundamental changes to 
how financial regulatory policy is made and revised, and a recognition of the 
core mismatch illuminated here, macroprudential policies are unlikely to achieve 
the ambitious aims originally envisioned for them. 
B. Proposals for Further Reform 
Just as we are not the first scholars to acknowledge the dynamism, com-
plexity, and unknowns of modern finance, we are far from the first to raise 
concerns about the processes through which law is made. Lawmaking has al-
ways been about compromise and tradeoffs, making the process almost too 
easy a target. There are also numerous trans-substantive debates that bear on 
the questions here at stake. Nick Bagley, for example, has raised fundamental 
questions about whether there may be “too much” procedure in administrative 
law,246 a claim that aligns with the concerns we raise. Because of space con-
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straints, we make little effort to cover the range of relevant ideas and proposals 
and focus instead on just a couple of the proposals that most clearly target the 
concerns we raise here. The first focuses on financial regulation in particular, 
and the second on a range of proposals for dealing with unknowns and related 
challenges in trans-substantive ways. 
1. Automatic Sunset Clauses 
As described in Part II, financial regulation often has the appearance of a 
single-shot game, with policymakers identifying a perceived market failure, 
going through some process of engagement and deliberation, and then design-
ing and implementing a rule aimed at eliminating this failure.247 This is espe-
cially the case at the domestic level, where significant regulatory reforms are 
often only implemented in response to financial scandals or crises. The prob-
lem, of course, is that the dynamism of finance means that regulation adopted 
at any particular moment in time may not be optimal at any future point. 
Moreover, complexity and unknowns—together with our own prior and com-
peting objectives—may mean that regulation fails to advance desired objec-
tives right from the start. This is especially the case for crisis-driven regula-
tion: where our incomplete understanding of the problem, together with the 
political, economic, and other exigencies of the crisis, often mean that regula-
tion misses the intended target.248 
Professor Roberta Romano has written extensively about these challenges 
and, on some level, many of her concerns mirror our own. Paramount among 
these concerns is that too much financial regulation is passed in the immediate 
wake of crises, resulting in rules that are not adequately informed and other-
wise tainted by the politics of scandal and crisis.249 She has argued that impos-
ing mandatory “sunset” clauses on these rules could improve the quality of 
financial regulation. These clauses would result in new rules automatically ex-
piring unless reaffirmed, thus potentially compelling lawmakers to incorporate 
new learning about the causes of a crisis and the consequences—intended and 
otherwise—of the reforms.250 
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Yet, taking complexity, dynamism, and unknowns seriously suggests that 
sunsets may well be a mixed bag, with even more potential to do harm than the 
stress tests. While turning a single-shot game into a two-shot game may help 
incorporate new learning and facilitate critical reassessment, it does little to 
respond to the nature or pace of change within the financial system over the 
longer run. Nor does it address the challenges created when the unintended 
consequences of a new regulation—in banking, for example—are experienced 
in other domains, such as insurance or securities. Indeed, given the propensity 
for logrolling within the vetogate model, automatic sunset clauses may intro-
duce their own adverse and unintended consequences. And, of course, while 
unknowns may be particularly problematic for crisis-driven regulation, they 
are also highly problematic for financial regulation adopted under less volatile 
political and economic conditions. Ultimately, however, our biggest concern is 
the net effect on regulation. A default rule that envisions less regulation cannot 
assure smarter regulation. This is not to rule out sunset clauses as a tool that 
may, at times, be warranted—but it does suggest that these clauses are not a 
sufficient response to the core challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and 
pervasive unknowns. 
2. Experimentalism and Experimentation 
The challenges we identify as core to finance also arise, albeit in different 
degrees, in an array of other domains. Accordingly, there have been a number 
of efforts and proposals to try to address the uncertainty that so often plagues 
attempts to produce effective regulations and enable informed discussion. 
Some of these efforts have focused on experimentation, seeking to conduct 
rigorous experiments that can generate the missing information prior to finaliz-
ing a new regulation or to facilitate quasi-experimentation by, for example, 
allowing states to implement different rules.251 There is much to commend 
these efforts, but they remain the exception rather than the norm, in significant 
part because they are feasible in only limited circumstances at this stage. There 
is much in this literature that might, in time, be useful in operationalizing a 
better way to address the challenges in finance that we identify as core. Going 
even further, and recognizing all regulation as experimentation, is the type of 
shift in mindset consistent with what we are advocating. 
So far, however, advocates have tended to not embrace the experimenta-
tion approach. They remain more focused on measurable costs and benefits 
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than the longer-term structural changes that we see as fundamental. This re-
sistance reflects the challenge of using this type of methodology to assess the 
impact on an outcome like the resilience of the financial system as a whole. 
Even in domains where it has more obvious benefits, however, efforts to utilize 
formal experimentation in rulemaking, although progressing, remain marginal 
and have had only mixed success.252 
Another approach that is working quite successfully in some domains is 
“experimentalism.”253 The experimentalist framework is based on a hub-and-
spoke structure that combines discretion and reporting by those on the front 
lines with ongoing revision of the rules by those at the center in light of new 
information. This type of iterative process can yield real gains in environments 
where detailed specification is difficult ex ante, and where there is some cen-
tralized mechanism that can collect, analyze, and revise rules in light of the 
insights only experience can yield.254 
The concerns we raise overlap with many of the concerns motivating ex-
perimentalism. Governance mechanisms designed to “compensate for the ab-
sence of ex ante knowledge” and promote “rapid, deliberate learning from par-
allel and collaborative exploration of new risks and possibilities” would seem 
to go a long way in addressing the challenges posed by the dynamism, com-
plexity, and unknowns of modern finance.255 Moreover, by critiquing the ex-
cessive efforts to optimizing a static regime, and embracing an understanding 
of “[r]eliability [that] entails responsiveness, not just to strong signals like 
prices but also to weak signals such as small anomalies or deviances,” experi-
mentalism reorients the regulation discussion in ways that are critical if we are 
to address the core challenges.256 
Given the importance of this work, it is all the more striking that models 
akin to experimentalism have been deployed only on a limited basis and with 
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decidedly mixed results in the realm of finance. Consider, for example, the 
discretion that the IRB approach under Basel II gave to the largest banks to use 
their own risk management systems to calculate their regulatory capital re-
quirements. The aim of this approach, like experimentalism, was to overcome 
the static, coarse, and backward-looking nature of standardized capital re-
quirements.257 This approach also resembled the experimentalist frame in that 
it enabled national regulators to harness and learn from the sophisticated risk 
management systems banks instituted and to update their assessments across 
firms accordingly, creating a system that theoretically could respond to chal-
lenges that neither banks nor regulators could identify and specify ex ante. The 
IRB approach, which also grew out of the premise that both banks and their 
regulators wanted to minimize the possibility of bank failure, hence tried to 
harness an area of common interest. The results, however, were disastrous. 
Although not fully implemented when the crisis hit, many view the IRB ap-
proach as a significant contributor to its severity.258 The large investment and 
commercial banks that were using this approach were among those who fared 
the worst when conditions soured, and lawmakers have substantially scaled 
back on the use of IRB in response.259 The notion that shared incentives can 
justify passing discretion along to those closer to the problem—whether from 
international rulemaking bodies like Basel to nation states or from regulators to 
banks—is among the casualties of the crisis. Whether it will be revived re-
mains to be seen. 
A related challenge is that for approaches like experimentalism to suc-
ceed, the signals going from spoke to hub must be—even if noisy—probative 
of the outcomes that regulation is seeking to achieve. This feedback is what 
allows for refinement over time. Yet financial markets often do not work this 
way. Among the reasons that the IRB approach failed so spectacularly is that 
many of the indicators that banks and their regulators focused on suggested 
that banks and the broader financial system were healthy when, as we know 
now, they were very far from it. Just as Minsky and others predicted, periods 
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of stability changed behavior and the pricing of financial assets in ways that 
ultimately made the financial system more vulnerable.260 The feedback, in oth-
er words, provided false signals that disguised the unhealthy system. This is 
part of what dooms efforts at formal experimentation, and also part of what 
makes experimentalism difficult. 
The experimentalist framework marks an important step forward relative 
to the more traditional approaches that still dominate. Yet at this stage, the fact 
that experimentalism—an approach that has worked so well in other do-
mains—has not been used more widely in financial regulation highlights the 
nature and magnitude of the underlying challenges. 
V. A MORE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION 
This Part complements our central claim that the mismatch between the 
nature of finance and the processes through which finance is regulated sets 
financial regulation up to fail by considering, in broad terms, how this chal-
lenge might be mitigated.261 Our call is for a more holistic approach to finan-
cial regulation. The aim here is both to provide a glimmer of hope and to fur-
ther illuminate the nature and magnitude of the challenge we now face by 
showing what would be needed for regulation to better accommodate the reali-
ties of modern finance. 
The term “holistic” is generally defined as “relating to or concerned with 
wholes or with complete systems rather than with the analysis of, treatment of, 
or dissection into parts.”262 The term holism was coined by South African 
statesman Jan Smuts in 1926 as part of an effort to illuminate the fundamental 
limitations in western approaches to knowledge in domains like science. As he 
explained, “Analysis, abstraction and generalisation are indeed necessary as 
instruments of scientific understanding, but they also necessarily involve a de-
parture from the complex concrete.”263 The effort to bring rigor requires break-
ing down a complex ecosystem into more knowable parts. This has some real 
benefits but also profound limitations. 
Shifting from abstractions to practice, we see multiple mechanisms 
through which a holistic approach to finance could improve regulatory pro-
cesses and outcomes. One avenue is through changing the analytical frame 
through which policy makers and others assess the landscape and options be-
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fore them. As we have seen, conventional approaches typically begin with the 
categorization of different species of markets and institutions. The Fed, OCC, 
and FDIC regulate “banks,” the SEC regulates “securities” and “investment 
funds,” and state insurance regulators regulate “insurance” firms. Reflecting 
this deeply engrained path dependence, these regulatory authorities are then 
charged with advancing specific objectives such as the providing for the safety 
and soundness of individual institutions, ensuring the informational efficiency 
of securities markets, and protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or 
fraudulent practices. In the process, they often ignore dynamics or problems 
outside their direct mandate.264 
Embracing a holistic mindset suggests that in adopting and revising the 
rules governing finance, policy makers should take a broader perspective. It 
would encourage regulators to see the markets and institutions they are seeking 
to change as part of a vast, complex, and constantly evolving financial ecosys-
tem that is itself part of an even more vast, complex, and evolving social sys-
tem. This does not mean that all of these effects would or could be addressed, 
but it would mean recognizing the potential for adverse ripples in other do-
mains and coordinating with others earlier and more often. 
A holistic mindset also brings to the fore the value of surveying the land-
scape for areas of opportunities or emerging, systemic issues that have not yet 
congealed enough to be salient using a more conventional lens. This could take 
the form of devising new ways to aggregate information currently held by dif-
ferent regulators to produce more complete and accurate depictions of how the 
financial system current works. It could also involve developing or incorporat-
ing new metrics to assess the health of that broader ecosystem, the role and 
perceptions of finance within society, and other factors. Although academics 
have made some progress in this regard, as reflected by SRISK and other 
measures of systemic risk,265 regulators have not yet established mechanisms 
for responding to the information embedded in these signals. This information 
might be used to redefine the problems that financial regulation is designed to 
address. More importantly, this process would be motivated by and reinforce 
an abiding humility about how much is known and understood at any given 
time.266 
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In time, a more holistic approach to financial regulation could be opera-
tionalized through changes in the regulation-making processes. The conven-
tional approaches that produced Basel III, money market regulation, and other 
post-crisis reforms bear all the hallmarks of a single-shot game: a malignancy 
is identified, alternative treatments are weighed and measured, and the most 
desirable treatment is enacted into law, fleshed out in regulation, supervised, 
and enforced. Underpinning this approach is the assumption that policymakers 
can and should prescribe the optimal course of treatment—that they can “get it 
right.” This assumption is evident in procedural rules—statutory or agency 
requirements for CBA being one prominent example—that are ostensibly de-
signed to ensure a degree of certainty around the impact of new regulation. It is 
also evident in the absence of institutional mechanisms designed to periodical-
ly assess the impact of new regulation after it comes into force. Yet, as our case 
studies illustrate, policymakers almost inevitably fail to accurately predict the 
impact of their decisions: not simply because they “get it wrong,” but because 
these decisions unleash consequences that would have been almost impossible 
to predict at any point during the process of designing new regulation.267 
In contrast, a defining feature of a holistic approach is the recognition that 
regulation functions as a continuous game. This has two important implications. 
The first is the necessity of institutional mechanisms designed to facilitate the 
aggregation, analysis, and dissemination of information with a view to promot-
ing ongoing learning within the regulatory community. The function of these 
mechanisms would not be limited to simply evaluating the costs and benefits of 
new regulation. Instead, these mechanisms would seek to monitor and evaluate 
ongoing structural changes to the financial system, assess the impact and effec-
tiveness of new regulation, and better understand the role and perceptions of fi-
nance within wider society. This in turn leads to the second implication—the 
need for flexibility in the processes governing the formulation, adoption, and 
revision of regulation. This flexibility is essential in order to ensure that new in-
formation is incorporated into the decision-making process and, ultimately, re-
flected in new regulation.268 Together, these processes reflect the view that 
change is both inevitable and endogenous, and that, therefore, efforts to optimize 
financial regulation are akin to building castles in the sky. 
Another related benefit of a more holistic approach is that, properly oper-
ationalized, it could help to address the legitimacy and accountability issues 
that continue to loom large in finance. The complexity of the financial system 
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not only means that rules often have unforeseen consequences, but it also 
means that those who are not financial experts have a marked disadvantage in 
regulatory debates. The result, too often, is disengagement and distrust. By 
compelling reconsideration of policy tradeoffs both before and after a crisis 
arises—when there is more meaningful information available about the actual 
effects of a contested rule or scheme—there is at least the possibility of broad-
er engagement and feedback. 
Lastly, a more holistic approach to financial regulation might also yield 
different outputs than the current regime. As vividly illustrated by the devel-
opment of the Basel capital and liquidity rules, the ongoing quest for optimiza-
tion has led to the adoption of an increasingly rigid and complex regulatory 
rulebook. This rulification is a product of pervasive regulatory arbitrage, the 
resulting reluctance on the part of elected officials to allocate discretion to ei-
ther regulatory authorities or market participants, and the misplaced belief 
that—in time—policymakers will be able to strike the optimal balance be-
tween competing priorities and objectives. By abandoning the idea that this 
type of optimization is possible, holistic approaches would enable regulators to 
adopt a more pragmatic stance: one based not on the tired “rules versus discre-
tion” debate, but on their experiences of how these different tools work (or do 
not) in various regulatory contexts. By the same token, knowing that regulators 
have the flexibility to adapt rules in response to changing circumstances may 
also reduce the incentives of market participants to invest significant resources 
in finding ways to circumvent them. In this way, more holistic approaches are 
arguably less likely to produce regulatory rulebooks that contribute to the dy-
namism and complexity of the financial system. 
CONCLUSION 
Examining the processes that undergird financial regulation in light of the 
realities of modern finance helps to explain why the resulting rules so often fail 
to achieve their purported aims. This mismatch also helps explain why so 
many Americans remain distrustful of Congress and others charged with mak-
ing these rules, in addition to the financial sector they regulate. Efforts to im-
prove financial regulation must grapple more directly with these fundamental 
process failures. There are no easy answers, and this Article does not purport to 
provide them. Nonetheless, this Article does suggest that a more holistic mind-
set could help mitigate many of these challenges, and that, given the sheer 
magnitude of the mismatch between the nature of modern finance and the pro-
cesses through which it is regulated, a profound shift is needed. 
 
 
 
